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22 August 1957

Dear Allan:

I am sending along two reports prepared initially
for [REDACTED] internal use which may be of interest to OIR, 25X1A8a
Sino-Soviet Bloc Trade Campaign to Penetrate Latin America,
and The Communist Party of Portugal.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a

Attachments:
Two reports

Mr. Allan Evans
Director, Office of Intelligence Research
Department of State

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGE TO: TS-S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HRV02

DATE:

DEC
1980

REVIEWER: 008210


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22 August 1977

Dear Sir:


Attached is a copy of The Communist Party of Portugal and of Sino-Soviet Bloc Trade Campaign to Penetrate Latin America. These reports were prepared by OIS for internal DDP use. It will be appreciated if you limit the reports to your Production Division and make no record of them in your Library. Naturally, we would welcome any comments your analysts care to make.

Sincerely yours,

 25X1A9a


Mr. S. I. Haller
Acting Director, Office of Research & Intelligence
U. S. Information Agency

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CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
DATE: 4 DEC 1980
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1. The attached report on the Communist Party of Portugal (PCP) is based on available information from Agency, State, FBI and military files. It deals mainly with the origins, growth and decline of the PCP, its organization and status, activities, policies, propaganda, publications and front organizations. Included in its appendices are the Proposed Party Statutes and information on PCP members, officials and sympathizers. It is limited in scope to the Communist Party in metropolitan Portugal and does not include an analysis of Communist activity in Portuguese colonial possessions nor does it deal with those elements of the PCP working into Portugal from outside the country. No attempt has been made to assess the PCP's position in the international Communist movement, nor to compare its development and doctrine with those of Communist parties in other countries.
 2. Research for this compilation revealed little reporting available on the PCP. We are fully aware of the gaps in the information presented
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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL
(Partido Comunista Portugues -- PCP)

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL
(Partido Comunista Portugues - PCP)

June 1957

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e. Recording Secretary: Jose Ernesto Sousa

f. Members: Antonio Andrade Gomes

Gustavo de Mendonça

Carlos Costa Campos

Virginia de Vilhena

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL (PCP)

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Both operations in the field and desk requirements have indicated a need for gathering together available reporting on the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). The primary reason for preparing this report has been the operational need for such a compilation.

An unavoidable consequence of using and depending primarily upon clandestine reports is that the finished product leaves much to be desired in terms of a complete and well-rounded survey of the PCP. We are fully aware of the gaps in the information presented and can only urge that the data be used, if at all, with the consciousness that the information is not only incomplete, but based, as well, on unevaluated information reports from sources of varying reliability.

The report has been prepared on the basis of information in Washington from Agency, State, FBI and military files. Its scope is limited to the Communist Party in metropolitan Portugal and does not include an analysis of Communist activity in Portuguese colonial possessions nor does it deal with those elements of the PCP working into Portugal from outside the country. No attempt has been made to assess the PCP's position in the international Communist movement, nor to compare its development and doctrine with those of Communist parties in other countries.

Research for this compilation revealed little reporting available on the PCP.

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5X1C8b [redacted] Agency and State field despatches have supplied the bulk of the research material used in the report.

The principal intelligence gaps include a lack of current and detailed information on: organizational development, internal Party conditions, leadership, training, espionage apparatus, financial support, extent of infiltration, international contacts and relations with the Spanish Communist Party and Moscow, and the effect of the 20th Congress of the CPSU on the PCP. Lacking factual reporting, a considerable part of the Party's organization and activities as reflected in the report is based on Party publications and published statutes which in application are highly elastic so that the

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picture presented is probably at variance with the actual situation.



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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL (PCP)

SUMMARY

The Communist Party of Portugal (PCP) comprises a very small minority of the Portuguese population. It offers practically no threat to the stability of the present Portuguese government. Deterrents to the Party's growth and influence are the strongly anti-Communist policies of the Salazar regime, the reliability and vigilance of the Portuguese internal security forces and the strength of the Catholic Church. The PCP, although not declared illegal by name, is in effect illegal by virtue of Portuguese anti-subversive legislation.

Despite these factors, however, the Party has continued to organize and operate for the past 36 years. In the event current repressive measures are relaxed or the Salazar regime is eventually removed from power, the Party's leadership, hard core, clandestine experience and organization constitute a political potential the significance of which might be enhanced through exploitation of the Party's unity appeal to opposition groups, popular front tactics and infiltration.

Although initially formed in 1920 as the Federação Maximalista by various groups sympathetic with the Russian Revolution of 1917, the PCP did not emerge as a factor of political significance until World War II, when the prestige of the Soviet Union increased the Party's membership to about 10,000. The Party's influence, however, began to decline following an abortive strike in 1946. Current estimates of the Party's strength vary from 3,000 to 3,500 hard core members and from 4,000 to 5,500 sympathizers. Principal centers of PCP activities are Lisbon, Oporto, Coimbra, Marinha Grande, San Joao de Madeira, the Faro-Portimao-Olhao area and the Alentejo agricultural region.

The PCP seeks the development of socialism, the overthrow of the Salazar regime and the assumption of power in Portugal. Throughout its history, internal dissension has plagued the Party as to how these objectives should be achieved. The moderates have advocated a gradual transition to socialism to facilitate penetration of significant elements in the Portuguese national life while the extremists have urged strict adherence to orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrines. In addition, a Titoist split in the PCP reportedly occurred in 1951 following a Party dispute which began in 1950. The Party has attempted to infiltrate the non-Communist opposition and various groups such as labor, youth, intellectuals and the armed forces, but without noticeable results in recent years.

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The two principal Communist front organizations are the National Democratic Movement (Movimento Nacional Democratico - MND), an extreme opposition group penetrated by the PCP, and the Democratic Unity Youth Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democratica, Juvenil - MUDJ), created by the Democratic Unity Movement (MUD), MND's predecessor, avowedly to seek restoration of free elections and establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal. Although the Party attempts to create the impression that these two front organizations are independent, they are believed to be directly controlled and supervised by the PCP General Secretariat.

The vigilance of the Portuguese internal security forces has restricted the current activities of the PCP primarily to the clandestine printing and circulation of Communist propaganda. PCP propaganda reflects the usual Communist themes, tempered to the conditions and circumstances prevailing in Portugal. These themes include anti-Fascism, peace, abolition of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, agrarian reform and social grievances.

The PCP announced it firmly supported the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the 30 June CPSU Resolution which, it declared, marked "a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism." The Party stressed that there is more than one road to socialism and that it is for each people to determine for itself the most suitable road. It rejected any and all interference from other nations and governments in Portuguese internal affairs. The decisions of the 20th Congress are reflected in the Party's Proposed Statutes, approved and published by the Central Committee in May 1956, which condemn the personality cult and affirm that the Party conducts all its activities upon the Leninist principle of collective leadership.

The Party currently advocates a policy of unity with all democratic forces opposed to Salazar. It urges its members not to remain aloof from political life but to ally themselves with all social classes and political creeds to achieve a united front. In May 1956, the Party announced its intention to participate in the 1957 and 1958 elections. It proposed a minimum electoral program upon which opposition groups could unite, and threatened to resort to force if the Salazar government uses repressive measures against the Party during the electoral campaign.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL (PCP)

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PORTUGAL
(Partido Comunista Portugues - PCP)

I. Origins, Growth and Decline of the PCP

A. Founding - Spanish Civil War (1917-1936)

The Russian Revolution of 1917 stirred up various groups of sympathizers in Portugal, whose ranks included members of pronounced Marxist tendencies. They encompassed anarchists, socialists and leftist democrats who limited their actions to praising the objectives of the Bolshevik revolution. These elements united to form the Federaçao Maximalista in 1920. During this initial stage the movement was led by men prominent in labor circles, such as Manuel Ribeiro, the writer, and Manuel Guilherme de Almeida, a worker.

The Federaçao Maximalista continued active until 7 July 1921, when it became the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues - PCP) and later affiliated with the Communist International. The Party has regarded itself as the heir of the Portuguese revolutionary tradition, which dates from the revolution of 1820. 1/ From 1921 to 1929 the Party's organization and influence upon the workers were practically negligible. However, with the election of Bento Gonçalves as secretary general, after his arrival from the USSR in 1929, the PCP became more active.

The military coup of 1926 led to dictatorship. The emergence of Salazar in 1926 and his creation in 1933 of the rightist authoritarian regime, the Estado Novo, conditioned the development of Communism in Portugal during the last three decades. The Estado Novo's anti-Communist policies made expansion of the PCP since its early days extremely difficult.

In 1931 the PCP was able to promote the first Communist-inspired and directed strike at Marinha Grande. Before this time, strikes were attributed to the General Labor Federation (CGT). The PCP, taking advantage of its new prestige, began to extend its activities throughout Portugal. In 1934 it mobilized the workers for a general strike to protest creation of government-regulated national labor syndicates of commercial and industrial workers under the corporative organization established by the National Labor Statute of 1933. To offset the PCP's failure to prevent creation of these syndicates, Gonçalves began attempts to infiltrate them, but with little success. 2/

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The PCP was practically destroyed by police action after passage of anti-subversive legislation, particularly Decree Laws 1901 of 21 March 1935 and 27.003 of 14 September 1936. 3/ Despite anti-subversive legislation, however, the party re-organized.*

In 1935 the PCP cooperated with various opposition groups to form a Popular Front which drew its supporters from Free Masons and former members of various political parties disbanded after the Portuguese revolution of 1926. Among the supporting groups were dissident elements of the Renovação Democratica (RD). Francisco Pinto da Cunha, head of the former Uniao Liberal Republicana (ULR), also was a supporter.

But the Portuguese Popular Front soon disintegrated because of internal dissension. Its remnants, under the influence of the PCP, grew into an organization successively called the National Anti-Fascist Council (Conselho Nacional Anti-Fascista) and finally, during World War II, the National Anti-Fascist Unity Movement (Movimento da Unidade Nacional Anti-Fascista - MUNAF).

B. Spanish Civil War - World War II (1936-1945)

The Party proved unsuccessful in disturbing Portuguese national life during the Spanish Civil War. At the outbreak of war in 1936 the Government penetrated the PCP, arrested its leaders, and suspended publication of Avante, the official Party organ. 4/ Increased police vigilance considerably reduced the Party's strength. With the arrest of Gonçalves, PCP attempts to infiltrate the national labor syndicates were paralyzed. In addition, the Party was involved in internal struggles.

The Communist International saw in the Spanish Civil War an opportunity to advance its cause in Portugal. An important role in that country was assigned to M. Pavel, a noted Communist and later chief of the Organization Bureau of the Comintern. However, lacking knowledge of the country, he was of little influence and was eventually arrested and expelled. 5/ In 1940, under the direction of Gonçalves, a group of militants released from prison attempted to reorganize the Party. They expelled "traitors" from the Central Committee and resumed publication of Avante. These efforts, however, were promptly crushed by the police.

* Crimes against the security of the state are enumerated in the new framing of the penal code, Decree Law 35.015 of 15 October 1945.

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In 1943 the PCP called its First Congress to discuss re-organization problems. During this Congress the PCP elected a three-man secretariat from members of the Central Committee to jointly fill the vacant post of secretary general upon the death of Bento Gonçalves. The members were Alvaro Cunhal ("Duarte"), Jose Gregorio ("Alberto") and Militao Bessa Ribeiro ("Antonio"). ^{6/} Shortly afterward, Ribeiro was arrested, and Manuel Guedes ("Santos") replaced him. This secretariat functioned almost continuously for about seven years. ^{7/}

During World War II, Soviet successes increased the prestige of the PCP and Party membership rose to its greatest height. The PCP line emphasized that: ^{8/} (a) the Allied campaign gave Portugal a new strategic importance; (b) the offensive in Russia and Africa had given the initiative to the United Nations; (c) Salazar's Fascist government made Portugal a potential target for Allied attack, although the danger of immediate invasion was not imminent; (d) the necessity of overthrowing the Salazar government and its replacement by a democratic government was essential. The PCP said it was willing to cooperate with all "progressives" to achieve this objective.

Avante recommended that the national struggle against Fascism include all Portuguese interested in the fall of the Salazar government, and urged all "democrats" and "patriots" to unite. Cities and towns were advised to form committees of national unity, composed of anti-Fascists and PCP delegates. In turn, these committees were to operate in close alliance with the National Anti-Fascist Council. ^{9/}

In 1944 there began a vigorous debate within the PCP as to whether the policy of strict adherence to the principles of Marx and Lenin should be pursued. Some members proposed the policy of a gradual transition to socialism to facilitate Communist penetration of important segments of Portuguese life. The PCP leaders were deeply concerned about disunity within the Party and recommended a bitter fight against "divisionists," especially Jose de Souza, Vasco do Carvalho, Cançado Gonçalves and Aristo Mesquita. ^{10/} A policy of rigid adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles was finally adopted, and a reorganization was carried out, including the selection of regional committees to control the provinces.

C. Post-World-War II (1945-1957)

At the end of World War II, there developed the Democratic Unity Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democratica - MUD), a

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movement in opposition to the Salazar regime.* By late 1945, when free elections were announced and the government had lifted or relaxed electoral restrictions, the PCP succeeded in penetrating the MUD. In 1946 the PCP participated in the MUD organization of the National Democratic Youth Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democratica, Juvenil - MUDJ), similar to Communist youth movements in other countries. The Party was thus able to influence to a small extent the shaping of policies and programs of the political opposition.

In April 1946, the PCP attempted to promote a general strike. Because of lack of political preparation in some of the strike areas, however, the Party lost control and called off the strike. This marked the beginning of the decline of the Party's influence. In addition, Party disorganization, government action, and loss of dynamic leadership through arrests contributed to its decline, which the PCP secretariat tried to counteract by attempting to attract intellectuals and youth. 11/

The PCP also tried to create a broad committee for a united front of workers to present claims of the working masses to employers, but this effort failed. Manuel Guedes, a member of the PCP Central Committee, formally proposed a United Front (Frente Unica) to struggle against the government of Portugal and against foreign interests, especially American, but he was unsuccessful. 12/

Despite these efforts, organizational differences stemming from an apparently fundamental split between the extremists and moderates ensued. In September 1946, the PCP held its second and last congress. Weakened by disorganization, the PCP adopted "new" tactics: it abandoned the strike as ineffective in Portugal; it removed the word "Communist" from all Communist propaganda to conceal its identity; and it made attempts to place trustworthy Communists in civilian and military positions. 13/

Party officials refer to the period from 1949 to 1952 as the Black Era. During this time police repression increased and through arrests the Party experienced serious losses of its leaders including its secretary general, Alvaro Cunhal, who is still imprisoned.

Because of increased police surveillance, the PCP replaced its congresses with "enlarged" meetings (reunao ampliada) of the Central Committee. There reportedly have been six such meetings, the latest of which was held in mid-1955. 14/

* The MUD was replaced in 1949 by the National Democratic Movement (Movimento Nacional Democratico - MND).

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Between the Fourth and Fifth meetings of the Central Committee, the Party claimed to have consolidated its management functions, appointed new members to the Central Committee and successfully conducted numerous worker and peasant "struggles." 15/

At the Sixth Meeting, however, the Party admitted the precarious state of its organization as well as a lack of political life and collective work. It also admitted its failure to apply Marxist-Leninist principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and self-criticism. The Central Committee attributed the primary cause of the Party's weakness to sectarianism which the Committee defined as the tendency to remain aloof as members of a secret organization from political life. Other causes given were repressive government measures, the arrest and imprisonment of PCP leadership and purges within the Party. 16/

Party activities during 1956 were directed primarily toward exploitation of the social unrest caused by economic conditions in northern Portugal which provided the Communists with an opportunity to foment discontent.

The PCP announced its intention in May 1956 to participate in the 1957 elections for deputies and the 1958 elections for county councils and President of the Republic. The Party proposed a minimum electoral program as a basis of unity with opposition groups and threatened to use force if the Portuguese government used repressive police measures against the Party during the electoral campaign. 17/

The PCP firmly supported the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the 30 June CPSU Resolution which, it claimed, marked "a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism." At the same time, however, the Party stressed that there is more than one road to socialism and that it is for each people to determine for itself the most suitable road. Only the Portuguese people can "decide their own destiny," the Party declared. 18/

The decisions of the 20th Congress are reflected in the Proposed Statutes of the PCP, which were approved and published by the Central Committee in May 1956.* The statutes condemn the personality cult and affirm that Party activities are conducted upon the Leninist principle of collective leadership.

The PCP today comprises a very small minority of the Portuguese population. Following its decline after World War II, it constitutes only a minor, almost negligible threat to the stability of the Portuguese government. Deterrents to the Party's growth and influence are the control of the Catholic Church, the strongly


* See Appendix A for proposed Party Statutes.

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anti-Communist policies of the Salazar regime and the reliability and vigilance of the Portuguese internal security organizations. Yet despite these factors, the Party has continued to organize and operate for 36 years.

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ORGANIZATION
OF THE
PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP)



~~SECRET~~II. Organization and Status of the PCP*A. Strength

Attempts to determine the number of Communists and Party sympathizers in Portugal involve consideration of several factors. Most of the available information on the PCP originates with the International and State Security Police (Policia Internacional e de defeso da Estado - PIDE), a wholly interested source. Opponents of the regime may be labeled Communist by the authorities regardless of their real political beliefs. In addition, many Communists and Party sympathizers may not actually embrace Communist ideology, but join or support the PCP and its front organizations because of real or fancied grievances arising from political, social and economic conditions in Portugal. Finally, the clandestine conditions under which the Party is forced to operate make it impossible to furnish exact or even approximate figures regarding its membership.

Estimates (1956) have varied from 3,000 to 3,500 hard core members and from 4,000 to 5,500 sympathizers in a total population of 8,166,000. 1/ Ten years after its formation in 1921, according to Communist sources, the PCP had only 700 members, 200 of whom were in prison or in exile. An intensive recruiting drive in 1932 reportedly succeeded in doubling the membership by 1935. Increased police vigilance at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War reduced its strength to 140 by 1938. The prestige of the Soviet Union during World War II reportedly increased PCP membership to about 10,000. Following the Party's decline in 1946, its membership has fluctuated in direct ratio to the successes and failures of Communism. 2/

The main centers of PCP activities are reportedly Lisbon, Oporto, Coimbra, Marinha Grande, San Joao de Madeira, the Faro-Portimao-Olhao area 3/ and the Alentejo agricultural region. 4/ Among these, the PCP is most active in the industrial areas, notably Lisbon, Oporto and Marinha Grande where, because of poor living conditions, workers are particularly susceptible to Communist promises for improvement. 5/ The Communists are also active among student groups, particularly at the University of Coimbra, and among intellectuals. 6/ In addition, the two known principal Communist-front organizations, the MND, described as the intellectual core of the PCP, and the MUDJ, are both under the direct control and supervision of the PCP General Secretariat, although the Party seeks to create an impression that they are

* Section II deals only with the Communist Party in metropolitan Portugal.

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independent. 7/

The Party seeks support among agricultural laborers, but reportedly confines its efforts among them to the southern part of Portugal, particularly the Alentejo region, where extensive landholdings exist and large numbers of farm laborers are employed. Thus far the party has reportedly had little success in recruiting agricultural laborers in the southern part of the country and virtually none in the central and northern areas, where landholdings are small and the owners generally work their own lands. 8/

Alvaro Cunhal, former secretary general, reported in 1948 that the Party membership consisted of 60 per cent industrial workers and 12 per cent farmers. The remainder comprised commercial employees, students, women, a small number of residents in the colonies and "other professions." In 1955 the PCP Central Committee reported that 80-85 per cent of Party members were industrial workers and agricultural wage earners. 9/

Recent available reporting indicates that the Portuguese internal security organizations have kept the PCP disorganized and reduced the influence of the Party to a minimum. Furthermore, in 1951 the Party suffered from internal dissension arising from a 1950 policy dispute which produced a Titoist schism. In addition, lack of funds and understaffing of its governing organs have seriously hampered Party activities. 10/

B. Organization

1. Party Organization 11/

The most recent information indicates that the present organization of the PCP includes a Congress, a Central Committee working through a General Secretariat, a Political Commission, three subsecretariats and numerous provincial, regional and district organizations, local cadres and Party cells. The Party builds its organizations on the basis of geographical division and place of employment.

a. "Illegal" Congress

The Congress, which is the highest directing organ of the PCP, is referred to as the "Illegal Congress" in Portugal, even by the Party. Its convocation and rules of representation are made by the Central Committee, which is also empowered to call special Congresses.

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The first Illegal Congress was held in 1943 and the second in 1946, but there have been no indications of any Congress sessions since 1946. The announcement by Avante in 1954 of new PCP Central Committee members and alternates suggests that, probably because of the vigilance of the Portuguese security forces, the Party has not been able to convene a full Congress and that the Central Committee has been performing the functions of the Congress.

According to the proposed Party Statutes,* the Congress performs the following functions:

- (1) Elects the Central Committee of the Party and fixes the number of its permanent and alternate members.
- (2) Establishes the political line of the Party.
- (3) Makes resolutions on the organization of the Party.
- (4) Evaluates the reports of the Central Committee and adopts appropriate resolutions.
- (5) Examines and resolves on the approval or modifications of Party statutes and programs.

b. Central Committee 12/

Between congresses, the Central Committee directs all the political work and organization of the Party. It is responsible for:

- (1) Organization and direction of whatever commissions and organizations the Committee considers necessary to implement the political line and current tasks of the Party.
- (2) Organization of controls on the application of Party decisions affecting the various organizations.
- (3) Distribution of the Party's strength.
- (4) Administration of the Party's financial resources.

* See Appendix A.

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The Central Committee determines the sphere of action of each of the Party's organizations which are grouped in accordance with the requirements imposed by clandestine operating conditions. The Party organization operating in a certain sector is considered superior to all those that operate within a part of that sector. All Party organizations are autonomous within their sphere of operations as long as their resolutions do not contradict the Party line.

The Central Committee elects from among its members the Political Commission and the General Secretariat.

c. Political Commission 13/

The Political Commission, acting through the secretary general, is responsible for maintaining the Central Committee's leadership in the interval between committee meetings. It studies the need for and calls meetings of the Central Committee. Whenever situations arise that require the attention of the Central Committee, and when that body cannot meet within the necessary time, the Political Commission is responsible for informing the members of the Central Committee of the situation and consulting with them on questions which have arisen.

d. General Secretariat 14/

The Secretariat, composed of three members of the Central Committee, is responsible, between meetings of the Political Commission, for insuring the daily application of the decisions of the superior Party organs and for preparing and executing the political measures affecting the Party's organizations and cadres. In addition to executive functions, each member of the Secretariat is responsible for agitation and propaganda activities in one of the zones of Portugal.

Meetings of the Secretariat are infrequent and usually are called by the secretary general. Decisions reached during the meetings are communicated to the membership through circulars and publication in Avante and O Militante.

e. Secretary General

The secretary general is the highest ranking member of the General Secretariat of the PCP. He calls meetings of the Secretariat and the Central Committee and is responsible for announcing the decisions to be followed by the membership.

~~SECRET~~f. Subsecretariats (or Zonal Secretariats) 15/

In 1950, the organization of the PCP was modified because of the necessity for greater security against police repression. The provincial, regional and subregional committees were replaced by the following three subsecretariats, or zonal secretariats, subordinate to the General Secretariat:

- (1) North Zone (area above the Douro River)
- (2) Central Zone (area between the Douro and Tejo Rivers, including Lisbon)
- (3) South Zone (area below the Tejo River)

Local committees and cell organs operated in these zones under the subsecretariats, but information on the strength and composition of the subsecretariats is lacking. Usually there was a secretariat in each of the different committees functioning in each zone.

Each subsecretariat was composed of a member of the General Secretariat who acted as leader, an active member of the Central Committee, and an alternate member of the Central Committee. Each subsecretariat was responsible for the organization and operation of the subordinate regional, district and local cadres.

The proposed Party Statutes, however, do not mention the three zonal secretariats. In describing the Party structure, they refer only to provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations and their directing organs, which indicates that this organizational break-down may have replaced the three zonal secretariats.

g. Provincial, Regional, Subregional, Local, Zonal and Class Organizations 16/

According to the proposed Party Statutes, the assembly is the superior organism of each of the provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal and class organizations. The directing body of each of these organizations is elected by the assembly of the respective organizations. The election of the directing bodies is confirmed by the Central Committee or by the organizations to which the Central Committee delegates these powers.

Because of the clandestine conditions under which the Party operates, the assemblies of these organizations cannot meet regularly. The Central Committee or the organisms to which the Central Committee delegates power determine the

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occasion and the favorable conditions for assembly meetings. They also appoint the directing bodies of these organizations when conditions do not permit the convocation of assemblies. The forms of organization and Party functions in these organizations remain under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee.

All the directing organs of the provincial, regional, sub-regional, local, zonal and class organizations of the Party have the following responsibilities:

- (1) To make resolutions and to use their own initiative in political questions in their sector of work.
- (2) To assure compliance with the decisions of the superior Party organs.
- (3) To strengthen the organizations under their direction and to create new organizations.
- (4) To orient and to give practical help to the organisms and cadres of the Party base in their work among the masses and in the organization of large and small campaigns by the people.
- (5) To select and assign Party cadres under their direction.
- (6) To organize economic aid from the masses for the Party and its press.
- (7) To enlarge and to control the distribution and study of Avante, O Militante and other Party publications and to publish propaganda by their own means.
- (8) To develop the study of Marxism-Leninism to elevate the ideological and political level of the Party.

h. Cells 17/

The cell is the basic organization of the PCP. Party cells are organized in businesses, factories, offices, mines; on fishing boats, merchant ships, warships; in ports, warehouses, legal offices, schools, hamlets, villages, estates; and in barracks and other military installations of the armed forces. Although the Party directs its attention primarily toward the formation of cells within these areas,

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street cells may be organized as long as the members do not work in places of production such as those mentioned above. Cells also can be created exclusively for women.

The superior authority in the cell is the cell assembly. It elects its directing organism which is the secretariat of the cell. When conditions do not permit the functioning of the cell's assembly, the secretariat of the cell is appointed by the immediately superior organization. 18/

Party cells have the following responsibilities: 19/

- (1) Reveal and explain the political line of the Party to the masses and maintain strict allegiance to them. Promote the distribution of Avante, O Militante, and other Party publications among the masses which have no Party allegiance and incite agitation by means of documents issued by the administration and by other means taken on its own initiative.
- (2) Strengthen the unity of the working class, the peasants, and other working classes through their mobilization and organization in the struggle for their more urgent needs.
- (3) Stimulate the people's fight for local aspirations in the town wards and city blocks, the fight for democracy and peace, and the struggle of the youth and women for their own aspirations.
- (4) Increase the effective membership of the Party.
- (5) Collect the dues and the payments for publications and organize the collection of funds for the Party and for Avante.
- (6) Encourage criticism and self-criticism and be uncompromising in the face of defects and errors in the work of the Party.
- (7) Reenforce the revolutionary vigilance and conspiratorial measures in defense of the Party and strengthen activities against infiltration of the Party ranks by enemy agents.
- (8) Promote and organize individual and collective study of Marxism-Leninism.

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In 1947 Party cells were reported to be two kinds of cells, "intellectual" and "industrial."

The "intellectual" cells had five members. Cells of this kind have been identified in the University of Lisbon's School of Medicine, School of Veterinary Medicine and School of Liberal Arts. They also were organized in the Higher Technical Institute and among lawyers and teachers. There is little information available on the organization and activities of the intellectual cells.

The "industrial" cell, or enterprise cell, is the term given Party organizations in factories, offices, warehouses, railway stations, transportation companies and other business organizations. The larger enterprise cells are made up of smaller nuclei, one of which is the cell secretariat, responsible for control and liaison with higher Party organs. The number of members in enterprise cells theoretically is not fixed; it may be three, ten or "dozens." The local or zonal committees select the leaders of the cells from among cell members who prove most capable and dedicated.

However, practical experience, the vigilance of the Portuguese security organizations, the needs of partisan activity and the requirements of efficient distribution and execution of assignments, have caused the PCP to recommend meetings limited to three or four cell members. A meeting of five members is considered the maximum, and one this size is held only for special reasons.

The size of each nucleus, as well as the method of liaison between nuclei and between the cell and superior Party organs is determined by practical exigencies.

2. Cell Control 20/

In 1947 the Cell Control Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party was reportedly one of at least five control committees subordinate to and directly responsible to the Central Committee of the Party.


The Cell Control Committee had at least five members. Each member reportedly had approximately 40 confidential agents, each directing the activities of a cell composed of four or five persons. Only the confidential agent supposedly knew the identity of his director on the Cell Control Committee.

The Cell Control Committee held a closed meeting every 10 days. A member of the Party's Central Committee was usually present to give orders and instructions. Sometimes the Cell Control Committee

received typewritten orders from the Central Committee. Results of the meetings were passed on to the cells in any way the cell controller could communicate with his confidential agents, occasionally by separate interviews.


In addition to the control maintained through the Central Committee's Cell Control Committee, the Central Committee and General Secretariat members on the subsecretariats maintain vigilant control from above of all activities and lesser officials. The zonal and local committees carry this rigid control downward to the enterprise cells through representation at cell meetings or by establishing contact with responsible cell members within larger cells having nuclei. The designated nucleus, the secretariat of the cell (or enterprise committee), maintains control within the cell and is responsible for liaison with superior PCP organs.

A hypothetical enterprise cell of eight members at a given factory could be organized into three nuclei as follows:




In such a cell the Party recommends two alternate liaison methods, although other methods are not excluded if found more expedient. Participation of a member of the secretariat in meetings of other nuclei is desired except when made inadvisable by special circumstances. The recommended liaison methods are shown in the diagrams below:

Method 1



One member (A) of the secretariat attends a meeting of one nucleus; another secretariat member (C) attends a meeting of the other nucleus.


~~SECRET~~Method 2

One member of the secretariat (A) meets individually with a member (D) from one nucleus; another secretariat member (C) meets individually with a member (G) of the other nucleus.

Enterprise Cell

Where sections exist in large cells, the PCP recommends that nuclei be formed in each section. In small offices and establishments where there are but few Party members, the cell can be made up of a single section and the formation of a cell secretariat is not needed.

Liaison between the enterprise cell and the superior PCP organizations (local committees or zonal committees) may be conducted by a member of the local committee or of a zonal committee who either attends cell meetings (or secretariat meetings in a large cell) or establishes individual contact with a responsible member of the cell.

3. Communications 21/

In 1932, the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a proposal that the PCP cadres be trained for special duties.

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In Portugal, on Comintern instructions, Communist agents confined their activities to agricultural workers, particularly vineyard employees; fishermen, particularly in the north of the country; and students. Propaganda also was spread in Mozambique and Angola. These efforts, however, were unsuccessful.

In 1935, Giorgio Popo, a Comintern emissary, reported to the Executive Committee of the Comintern that he had found doctrinal errors, serious technical incompetence and financial abuses in the PCP Central Committee itself. This problem was discussed at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and Ercoli-Togliatti* was entrusted with the task of unifying the PCP. However, the Spanish Civil War cut short those plans.

The Portuguese internal security forces reportedly have no positive proof that the PCP receives instructions from Moscow, or from any other Communist organization outside of Portugal. However, the Portuguese police reportedly know that the PCP has a channel of communication for the transmittal of information between Moscow and Portugal and that the PCP maintains contact with other Communist parties, especially the Spanish, through "an individual stationed in North Africa."

The Spanish consul at Faro (in Southern Portugal), according to a January 1953 report, expressed the belief that Communist propaganda was brought by Portuguese fishermen from Port Lyautey, French Morocco, for distribution in Portugal and Spain. The Spanish consul believed that the Portuguese Communists received guidance and instructions--and to a limited extent--funds, as well as propaganda, from Port Lyautey.

4. Cultural Groups

The PCP has "intellectual sectors," cinema clubs under the Circulo de Cinema, and theater groups within its organization. The functions of the "intellectual sectors" (generally composed of doctors, lawyers, engineers and other professionals who joined the Party while students and who are unable or unwilling to break away) are to give financial and operational assistance to the Party and to use the prestige of their members to attract students to the MUDJ. The members also reportedly furnish safe houses, channels of communication, transportation, clandestine meeting places and medical and legal help for the Party. ^{22/} Members of the "intellectual sectors" reportedly have no part in making Party policy. ^{23/} Cinema clubs and theater groups are used in fund raising. ^{24/}

* Ercoli was the pseudonym for Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party.

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~~SECRET~~C. Leadership

Dissension within the PCP frequently has been reported. 25/

In a Party crisis of 1950 Jose Gregorio (pseudonym "Alberto"), who opposed Communist collaboration with other opposition groups within Portugal, reportedly forced Julio de Melo Fogaca (pseudonym "Ramiro"), who led a faction favoring coalition with legal opposition groups, to capitulate. Gregorio thereupon reportedly became the undisputed head of the PCP.* 26/

Despite reports as late as the spring of 1952 that dissension within the Party ceased after Gregorio's victory over Fogaca in 1950, 27/ a press despatch from Lisbon dated 6 March 1951, deriving from "well informed sources," reported a Titoist split in the PCP. According to the report, anti-Russian members of the PCP Central Committee resigned when the Central Committee refused to break with the Cominform, during a secret meeting held in Coimbra, and formed a "National Communist Party," which placed national interests above those of Russia. The Central Committee members who resigned reportedly were joined by influential leaders of the National Peace Committee (Comite Nacional Pro-Paz), who resigned their Peace Committee posts on the grounds that it was dominated by Moscow. The dissident members reportedly resolved to free themselves from "Marxist doctrine" and the political domination of Russia in the same manner as had Tito in Yugoslavia. Names and the number of persons involved in this reported split were not given in the report. 28/ No other reports on this "Titoist" split of 1951 are available, and it is possible that it originated from, or was confused with, the events of 1950.

Gregorio was considered the undisputed leader of the PCP as late as the spring of 1954. A 1955 report named him as one of the three-member PCP Secretariat, with no reference to further dissension. 29/ However, in December 1954, Avante reported a factional dispute. Joao Rodrigues reportedly was expelled from the PCP for factionalism at a Party meeting following the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee (Va Reuniao Ampliada do Comite Central). With two other Party members who followed his leadership, Rodrigues was accused of having formed an ideological splinter group which he controlled without reference to the higher Party authorities.

* Fogaca, however, was reportedly a member of the PCP Central Committee in 1954, and Avante named "Comrade Ramiro" as speaking in the name of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in December 1954.

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~~SECRET~~D. Finances

Evidence of Party funds coming from sources other than membership fees and voluntary contributions is difficult to find, although some funds have been reported coming in from outside the country by fishing boats. Raffles have been a so-called voluntary fund raising method, although evidence indicates that these raffles are never actually held nor is it expected there will be a drawing. 30/ Another method of fund-raising employed by the PCP has been the sale of tokens at one escudo each. 31/

According to latest available reports, the PCP is in a critical financial condition because of heavy expenses incurred by the front organizations MUDJ and MND, the lax payment of dues, and the failure of some Party functionaries to turn in all the money collected. Cinema clubs and theater groups consequently have been ordered to increase their activities to raise funds to keep the Party operating. 32/

An additional major reason for the reportedly critical financial situation of the PCP is the expense of supporting Party functionaries. Because the PCP is forced to operate clandestinely, its leaders must assume false identities and keep moving from place to place, circumstances which make it virtually impossible for the functionaries to pursue gainful occupations. One of the alleged purposes of the contraction of Party organization into three zones (North, Central, and South) was to reduce the number of officials which the Party had to support. 33/

Issues of Avante periodically report purported donations to the PCP. The total thus reported for the period May-August 1954 was \$34,906.70 escudos.*

E. PCP Penetration in Portugal

The Portuguese Communist Party has followed a policy of infiltrating the non-Communist opposition to Salazar, but without noticeable results in recent years. In 1952 it was reported that certain important members of the Portuguese government feared that the government party, the National Union (Uniao Nacional), and the Portuguese Legion (Legiao Portuguesa - the government's paramilitary internal security organization) had been penetrated by the Communists; however, no later information has become available on this subject. 34/

1. Labor

Communist efforts to penetrate the government-controlled

* 28.95 escudos = \$1.00 in 1954.

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national labor syndicates and other Communist efforts directed toward labor have been reported from time to time. The actual extent of Communist penetration of labor remains obscure, although the national security forces appear to have prevented the Communists from making any sizeable inroads.

The PCP's limited success in infiltrating labor groups has been confined mainly to the industrial workers. Communist cells have been identified at various times in the following industries: water, gas, electricity, telephone, land and water transportation, publishing, naval arsenal, munitions, garment manufacturing and construction. Infiltration also has been reported in the following national syndicates: Civil Construction Workers, Stevedores, Ceramic Industry Workers, Cork Workers, and Street Railway Workers. The penetration, however, into any one industry or syndicate has not been significant. 35/

In the past the Party has sponsored labor programs emphasizing: the adjustment of salaries to meet rising costs of living, improvement in the retirement and relief systems, paid vacations, and similar measures to gain labor support. 36/

The PCP considers that one of the most important tasks of the enterprise cells within legal entities is penetration of the official Portuguese labor syndicates. 37/ It rejects the formation of illegal labor syndicates such as those organized by the Portuguese anarchists.

The purpose of all PCP labor syndicate activity is "to transform a National Labor Syndicate from a demagogic organization serving Fascism and reactionary management, into an organization which defends the interest of the workers." PCP members are to persuade workers with no Party affiliations to become active in the national labor syndicates, "fighting there, utilizing it and making use of its service to defend their class interests."

The PCP zonal, local, regional and central committees are to coordinate and unify labor syndicate activity, as are the enterprise cells. Members of enterprise cells are directed not only "to agree" with the activity of the national syndicates but to work regularly in them. The enterprise cells are to study the activities of the syndicates and to strengthen them by influencing workers to participate in their activities. They are to request syndicate intervention with management or government so that workers' demands may be presented, encourage workers to concentrate on national syndicates, support the work of the syndicate committees and, wherever possible, promote assemblies within the syndicates at which conditions of the workers can be discussed.

During elections within the syndicates each enterprise cell is to work for the establishment of a list for the leadership of

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a syndicate and the formulation of an electoral plan which will assure success.

An important task for the enterprise cell is the formation of labor committees to study closely the activities of the national syndicates and to interest workers in those activities. Such committees are to be legal and to appear legitimately interested in the activities of the syndicate.

The Party suggests that these labor committees might propose that the "Fascist" administrative committee directing a national syndicate be replaced and then assume the initiative to call special assemblies in conjunction with the legal labor commissions. These assemblies could be convened to discuss workers' problems and be held according to official statutes.

The enterprise cells are directed further to incite the workers to require that democratic processes be adopted within the national syndicates, that meetings be held, that leaders report their activities to their associates, and that the workers always be heard before collective contracts are signed.

Although the PCP has sought support among agricultural workers, whose relatively low standard of living has provided a fertile field for Communist recruitment, the Party has achieved little success. It has confined its efforts chiefly to southern Portugal, particularly in the Alentejo region, where, in contrast to the central and northern areas of Portugal, extensive landholdings exist and large numbers of farm laborers are employed. 38/

Attempts to indoctrinate agricultural workers reportedly have been relatively recent, as the PCP until 1944 was primarily preoccupied with industrial workers.

In 1944, the PCP created an organization of groups or cells of peasants prepared to disorganize transport by night attacks. Contact agents in various provinces were responsible for upsetting the rationing system by every means, provoking delays in forwarding goods destined for various consumption and distribution centers. Connections in railroad and bus services assisted them in their activities. 39/

The Party's 1954 program recommended the abolition of all debts contracted by poor peasants with Agricultural Credit Funds, banks and money lenders. The Party has consistently criticized the contract relationship between the large estate owners and workers and favors the abolition of all rent, share-cropper and quit-rent contracts. At the same time the 1954 program called for immediate help to peasants through easy and long-term loans, selected seeds and machinery. The Party recommended confiscation

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of all lands belonging to large farmers and free distribution to salaried farm workers, day laborers and farmers. It favored suppression of all local taxes, including the military tax paid by peasants, and reduction of the government taxes paid by poor peasants. 40/

In 1956, the PCP continued its attempts to promote higher daily wages for agricultural workers and urged the conclusion of contracts for the entire harvest period as a protection to workers. The Party also recommended eliciting the support of small businessmen to obtain the workers' demands, as well as a greater organizational effort through programs specifically geared to the workers' needs and interests. 41/

The Party also has been concerned with organizing female workers and peasant women for exploitation in political, labor and cultural matters. 42/

2. Armed Forces

The PCP has been active in its attempts to infiltrate the Portuguese armed forces, which it regards as the principal support of Fascism. There is no evidence, however, that the Party has made progress among officers and non-commissioned officers of the Portuguese Army. The proportion of army recruits exhibiting leftist tendencies is reportedly small, consisting mainly of those exposed to MUDJ propaganda during student days. Recruits who show leftist tendencies during screening are assigned to a "disciplinary unit" for their term of service but are not restricted after discharge. 43/ Effective security measures and loyalty of the armed forces to the regime are deterrents to the influence of Communism.

The PCP established a Military Committee to penetrate and supervise Party fractions within the armed forces. Its responsibilities included: 44/ (a) liaison with the PCP Central Committee, (b) naval units, and (c) military units stationed east and west of Lisbon.

The committee published several mimeographed sheets: A Voz de Soldado, Sargento, Oficial Miliciano, and for the navy, O Lomo.

In 1953, the PCP placed Souza Cruz (fnu) in charge of its clandestine apparatus for the penetration of the junior officer ranks of the Portuguese Army. Cruz, a former captain in the Portuguese cavalry, fled to France several years ago. His return was reportedly facilitated by an amnesty granted military exiles by Salazar. 45/

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The PCP considers that the large number of inductees from various professions each year as well as the regulars in the Portuguese fiscal guard and public security guards offer a membership potential for the Party because of the low pay, unfavorable food and living conditions, alleged ill-treatment, long hours of service and promotion difficulties. To exploit these causes of discontent within the armed forces, the PCP has recommended the following measures: 46/

- a. Neutralize and develop the armed forces into anti-Fascists through propaganda which stresses how the armed forces suppress the workers' aspirations.
- b. Establish Party cells in military units and initiate a regular program of enlightenment which unmasks American dominance over Portugal.
- c. Contact comrades when inducted or transferred to new assignments, informing them of susceptible elements for recruitment within the armed forces.

F. Espionage, Security and Paramilitary Activities

1. Espionage Apparatus

There is no available evidence that the PCP has an organized espionage apparatus in metropolitan Portugal. As of 1952 it engaged in intelligence operations--if at all--on a sporadic and unorganized basis. 47/ However, the fact that the Party has continued to organize for the past 36 years, while in effect illegal, indicates that the Party has developed some form of counterespionage or security organization to protect itself and its activities.

2. Security Practices

Because the PCP is illegal in Portugal, it avoids maintaining installations, archives and card files covering its organization. Compartmentation of committees is a basic tenet of the PCP. A limited number of functionaries are assigned responsibility for Party security in each region. Intermittently Avante publishes names of persons the PCP suspects of working with or for the police. 48/

The PCP maintains safehouses which are rented by functionaries under false names and under orders from the Secretariat.

In addition to safehouses rented in false names, other safehouses are legal residences of members or sympathizers who have

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the confidence of the Party. They aid leaders in normal travel or in flight, providing lodging or transportation in their private automobiles to indicated points of refuge or meetings. Most of these safehouses are residences of medical men, or of other persons of high standing in their communities.

When leaders need to meet, one of these houses is usually selected. Occupants of the safehouses may or may not be informed that a meeting will be held. The participants arrive separately from different points, escorted by persons having the confidence of the leader calling the meeting. In the event a leader lives far from the meeting place, he proceeds to it by stages, usually by night journeys, staying during the day in "illegal" houses, or safehouses. Meetings in safehouses, however, are rare and usually are held only by the PCP Secretariat or Central Committee.

PCP literature is centrally distributed through the Party organization from higher to lower echelons. Local distribution is carried out by Party members and sympathizers, particularly by those having establishments, such as grocery stores and bakeries where secure storage is available and local traffic is unlikely to arouse police suspicion. 49/

Communist literature also is imported from abroad, particularly from Brazil. Brazilian and Portuguese ships with Communist crew members have brought in some Party publications. Literature from Spain and France reportedly comes in by way of Port Lyautey, Morocco and Tangier, carried by small boats plying between Portuguese and North African ports. 50/

3. Paramilitary Operations

In the early 1940's movements of small arms reportedly crossed the frontier from either Spain or Morocco into Portugal. Many shipments have included light machine guns, radio equipment, pistols, pistol ammunition and hand grenades for the Portuguese Communist Party. 51/

Some contraband has arrived from French Morocco in fishing vessels and been transferred to a Portuguese launch which landed on the Portuguese Coast in the Algarve Section. This also has been one means of transporting funds into the country for the PCP. 52/ War materials have been sent from France to the PCP by French troller and then transferred to a Portuguese fishing boat. 53/

In 1950 the MND was reported to be organizing a group of military saboteurs to sabotage Portuguese military aviation. 54/

~~SECRET~~III. Activities and Policies of the PCP

The goal of the Portuguese Communist Party is the development of socialism, the removal of Salazar and the assumption of power in Portugal.* The decisions and resolutions taken at the 1943 and 1946 congresses of the PCP disclose the main political lines of the Party in those periods. A comparison of the resolutions of the two congresses shows a change in emphasis by 1946, but several of the trends are strikingly similar.

A. First Illegal Congress, 1943 1/

The First Illegal Congress of the PCP, held in December 1943, was concerned mainly with the need to reorganize the Party which had been seriously split in 1940, and with discussion of all phases of its activities, including its organization throughout Portugal and its recruitment campaign.

The resolutions of the 1943 Congress gave the Secretariat of the Central Committee complete power in dealing with members of the Party. They particularly emphasized the need to organize agricultural workers, labor groups, and army and youth groups, acknowledging at the same time the weakness of the PCP within those groups.

As a prelude to their later activities, the PCP recommended the penetration and support of anti-Fascist front movements. The support of Catholics in the fight against Fascism also was elicited.

The Congress stressed the short history of dissidents within the Party, the numerous arrests of Party members and the infiltration of police agents into the Party.

B. Second Illegal Congress, 1946 2/

While the PCP in its 1943 Congress was concerned primarily with Party organization, in its Second Illegal Congress in 1946 it broadened its program and policies which assumed a revolutionary trend. The PCP advocated a national crisis which would incite the masses to overthrow the Salazar regime by force. The Party urged its members to participate in any military uprisings, but criticized as misleading the belief that a military coup d'etat alone could succeed.

* See Appendix A, Proposed Party Statutes, Article 1.

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In the 1946 Congress the Party also reaffirmed its failures and stressed the need to organize and penetrate labor syndicates, youth and the army. In addition it advocated appealing to small proprietors and small businessmen, women and fishermen. The 1946 resolutions recommended the organization of the Party within the colonies, and advocated the support and expansion of "anti-Fascist" fronts such as MUD, which had been formed in 1945.

It recommended that the Party centralize its policy formation in accordance with Leninist principles. At the same time, however, it favored decentralization for operational purposes.

It criticized the European Reconstruction Program initiated by the US as interfering in the internal affairs and sovereignty of the participating European nations.

C. Legal and Illegal Activities of the PCP, 1947 3/

In 1947 the PCP allegedly defined the scope of its legal and illegal activities.

1. Legal activities included:

- a. election of Party members to leadership in sporting, recreational and cooperative groups;
- b. formation of cultural commissions within these groups to promote libraries and lectures;
- c. organization of raffles and entertainment for the Party's financial gain;
- d. dissemination of Marxist literature through book-selling agencies, such as "Publicacoes Europa-America" or "Claridade e Cosmes";
- e. election of Party members to managerial positions in the national syndicates, the people's houses and the fishermen's houses (The people's houses, composed of farm workers and operators, and the fishermen's houses, composed of fishermen and employers, are part of the corporative organizations of Portugal. In addition to protecting occupational interests, the houses are organs for social cooperation.);
- f. formation of syndicate committees to study and present claims jointly with labor management;
- g. formation of market and labor committees among the

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peasants of Alentejo, organizing large groups of them into people's houses;

- h. collaboration and exchange with student groups and attempts to control them.

2. Illegal activities were:

- a. Party organization, including recruitment of new members and dissemination of clandestine publications;
- b. formation of "trade cells";
- c. political education of all Party members;
- d. penetration of syndicates, people's houses, fishermen's houses, sports, recreational and cooperative meetings, MUD, MUDJ, MUNAF and feminine auxiliaries.

D. 1950 Policy Debate 4/

Factionalism has been frequent in the Party's history. In 1944 a Party debate began when certain members who belonged to the Prison Communist Organization of Tarrafal proposed a so-called policy of gradual transition to socialism instead of the policy of strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles then followed by the Party. From 1944 to 1950 the meetings of the PCP Secretariat, Central Committee and the Second Illegal Congress were concerned with this policy debate.

The most thorough treatment of the debate is found in a pamphlet issued by the Central Committee in June 1950. The policy of transition was characterized by the pamphlet as opportunist, contrary to proper Party orientation and foreign to the interests of the working class.

The pamphlet contrasted the orthodox Party teaching with that of the advocates of the policy of transition. Whereas the struggle of the masses was designed to overthrow Fascism, the transition advocates would simply undermine Fascism by establishing a "government of transition" that would collaborate with discontented Fascist and moderate elements. Instead of overthrowing Fascism, the discontented Fascists and the army would be aroused to overthrow only the Salazar clique and conduct a partial purge of the government. For the transition advocates, disunity of the Salazar government would be an end result, but for the orthodox Party it would be simply a means to national revolution. The pamphlet said the policy of transition falsely advocated

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fighting only until "an easy way out" was found. It would thus encourage the workers and Portuguese people to lose faith in their own forces and to hope for aid from Britain and the US.

With bitter criticism, the pamphlet attempted to demonstrate that by following the policy of transition, the Party's initiative and leadership would pass to persons not of the working class or of the Communist Party. The mass movement would be emasculated and the class struggle abandoned. Actually the life of the Salazar regime would be prolonged and the Party submerged "into the pool of opportunism." The "interests of the bourgeoisie and foreign imperialism" would hamper the Party's struggle for the defense of the interests of the workers.

The development of an ideological faction such as that which espoused the cause of transition meant that the voice of an enemy was heard inside the Party, the pamphlet declared. Only the Party leadership's vigilance and unity and the correct orientation of the Central Committee--particularly the role of Comrade Duarte (Alvaro Cunhal) in defending the Party line--terminated the debate with the defeat of opportunism.

Several reasons, however, were given to account for the emergence of the policy of transition. As defined in a letter from the Secretariat to Comrade Ramiro (Julio de Melo Fogaça) these were:

- (1) the lack of confidence in the Portuguese working class and in the Communist Party;
- (2) the low theoretical and ideological level of the comrades who were imprisoned in Tarrafal;
- (3) misunderstandings about World War II and the nature of Fascism;
- (4) overestimation of their political ability by the leading comrades from Tarrafal.

The great effort this pamphlet made to balance the harm and good derived from the policy debate and to emphasize the allegedly successful defeat of the dissenting policy, may signify that the Party's leadership recognized continuing dissent in the Party membership and sought to combat it by a full sifting of the debate between opposing forces in the Party. The pamphlet concluded by stressing the need for awareness by all Party organizations and militants of the Party's final basic decisions against the policy of transition and the need for discipline in following them. No similar airing of ideological dissension has been

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reported since this pamphlet attempted to resolve the dispute in 1950.

E. Party Program, 1954-1957 5/

In March 1954 at its Fifth Plenary Meeting, the PCP Central Committee studied ways of reinforcing and enlarging a policy of unity of action by Communists with all "true democrats and patriots." At this meeting the Central Committee agreed upon and adopted its program for action, which was printed as a separate pamphlet and circulated as the "Projecto de Programa do Partido," or Party program.

Before describing the troubles of Portugal and the remedies the PCP would like to provide, the pamphlet analyzed why the Communist Party must continue where the bourgeois revolution of 1910 left off. Instead of consummating the popular revolution, the rising of 1910 which effected the overthrow of feudal remnants, merely set up a regime controlled by the reactionary and monopolistic bourgeoisie. This class, the PCP held, was now allied with US imperialists "in the maximum exploitation of the working masses of the country and of the colonies." The PCP, however, had fought for 33 years in the interest of the working class. It aimed to overthrow the reactionary bourgeoisie by building a "fraternal alliance of the working class with the peasantry" and by struggling for unity with the small and medium bourgeoisie and the "progressive" intelligentsia. The old bourgeois politicians, even those who say they are opposed to Fascism, would not be able to supplant Fascism and institute a "truly democratic Constitution." The Party asserted that only the Communists could carry out this task to solve Portuguese problems and improve conditions of life for the workers.

The PCP proclaimed that the Communist program for "democratic revolution" was the only way to deal with such obstacles to Portugal's progress as US imperialist designs on Portuguese independence, the retarded Portuguese economy, the wretchedness of the working class, the starvation wages, the landlessness afflicting the peasantry, the persecution of the "progressive" intelligentsia, the dissatisfaction of women, young people and colonials and the oppression of Salazar's police.

The overthrow of the Fascist forces was to be accomplished by uniting in force "true democrats and patriots," and by combining the disaffected working masses with the middle classes, women, youth and "progressive" intellectuals. As this program indicates, Party policy was designed to appeal to all outside the Party sufficiently opposed to Fascism to be attracted by a call to rise against it.

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The reforms presented in this program included several "liberal-democratic" features. The government which was to succeed Fascism was to dissolve the national assembly and democratize the government apparatus by building in some of the features of a responsible parliamentary system and of a local administration conforming to local needs. Political prisoners were to be liberated and "democrats" who had been persecuted returned to public life. The PIDE and the Portuguese Legion were to be dissolved and the army cleansed by the removal of high Fascist officers. The Fascist organizations, such as the National Union, were to be destroyed and Fascist legislation revoked. All responsible for Fascist crimes were to be tried. The fundamental democratic freedoms--freedom of speech, press, meeting, strike, religion, association and right to form political parties--were to be established so that completely free elections could be held. Other sections of this program include the institution of a progressive income tax, provision of education for all under 15 years of age and improved housing.

The program called for renewing friendly and peaceful relations with all nations, including the USSR and the People's Republic of China. It declared that war propaganda should be prohibited and the right of self-determination should be granted to Portuguese colonials. In addition it suggested detailed reforms for both working classes and the peasantry.

The key to achieving the necessary power to overthrow Fascism and restore democracy was to be national unity and a popular front. Communists could and should unite with other opposition groups to fight Fascism, defend peace and national independence. The PCP stresses that Communists should abjure "prejudicial sectarianism" and ally with persons of all social classes, creeds and political beliefs to achieve a united front. This theme runs repeatedly through recent Party literature.

The Party's latest bid for electoral unity was the declaration which it issued in May 1956 announcing its intention to participate in the 1957 elections for deputies and the 1958 elections for county councils and President of the Republic. The Party reaffirmed its position that the Salazar regime depends for its existence solely upon division within the democratic forces. It proposes, as a basis of unity with the democratic opposition, the following minimum electoral program:

1. Raising the living standards of the people.
2. Defending the national economy against the monopolistic policies of the Salazar government.

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3. Political independence of Portugal and viable economic relations with all nations.
4. Restoration of democratic liberties.
5. Amnesty for political prisoners.

According to the PCP, political differences between the Communists and the democratic opposition would not deter efforts to achieve this minimum electoral program. The PCP claims that none of the parties of the democratic opposition are in a position to assume sole leadership for any decisive struggle; therefore, the joint action of all anti-Salazarist parties is required to achieve victory. Attempting to allay fears of Communist collaboration on the part of the democratic opposition, the PCP contends that it will not dominate the leadership of the anti-Salazarists because the PCP forms only a part of the grouping of parties in the vanguard for the unification of democratic forces.

Of significance is the threat of the PCP in the forthcoming elections to meet force with force, if the Portuguese government continues to use "terrorist methods" (police suppression) against the Party, and place the responsibility for any violence which may ensue directly on the Salazar government. If the PCP should resort to force such activity would probably be spearheaded by the MUDJ. 6/

F. Strike Activities

Strikes in 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1947 were brought about by Party-controlled trade committees in the factories. Each local committee of the PCP set up factory cells in the most important factories. These cells were to develop the Party membership by recruitment and by distribution of propaganda sheets. They also were to form committees of various trades within each plant.

One member of each trade committee was chosen delegate to a permanent inter-trade committee within the factory, to present and defend claims to the management of respective syndicates. The inter-trade committees were composed almost exclusively of non-Communist workers chosen and supported by Party members who kept their membership secret. PCP training and indoctrination enabled the Communist cell members, as the most effective leaders among the workers, to guide their voting.

Although in a minority, the PCP was in complete control. With a committee in each trade chosen by popular vote of the workers who had confidence in the decisions of the committee, control of

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the workers of a factory was effected through the control of the inter-trade committee by a member of the factory cell.

The PCP-sponsored strike in 1946 was one of the most important attempted by the Party. However, it failed because it lacked proper direction and was subsequently called off.

In 1949 the Communists attempted to get the Lisbon stevedores to strike for one hour as a gesture of sympathy for the striking London dock workers. After a canvass of the stevedores showed that 90 per cent were opposed to such a move, the plan was abandoned. 7/

The PCP has been active, through the efforts of one or two Communist agitators, in instigating the Matosinhos fishermen to revolt against the new system of contracts. Communist leaflets attacked alleged exploitation by the Salazar government and recommended that fishermen refuse to work under such "infamous conditions." The leaflets stressed that the fishermen were the poorest paid workers in Portugal and emphasized that the Portuguese Communist Party supported their demands. 8/

Government control of Portuguese syndicates, however, has hampered PCP strike agitation in all its efforts.

G. Attitudes toward Portuguese Foreign Relations

The PCP declares that the Iberian bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Luso-Brazilian Treaty are military pacts linking Portugal to the war plans of the "international reactionary forces." A repetitious PCP theme is that the Salazar government is preparing aggressive war against democratic and peaceful countries like the USSR, the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic and the People's Democracies. 9/

The PCP supported all the principles in the statement issued at a conference in Moscow in 1954 attended by delegates from the USSR, the People's Republics of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and China, and the German Democratic Republic. It held the declaration, which pointed out "dangers" to peace in Europe and the world if Germany were rearmed and the Western European Union agreements ratified, was important to the peace and security of the nations, although it sent no delegates to the conference. The PCP declared that the Western agreements could not only erect new and greater barriers to the reuniting of Germany, but would create bitter opposition even between the two parts of Germany. They also would bring danger of war to both Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, the PCP held.

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The Portuguese Communist Party favors: (a) friendly relations with all nations, including the USSR, the People's Republic of China and the People's Democracies; (b) nationalization of all large foreign enterprises in Portugal harmful to the national economy; (c) elimination of foreign military bases from the national territory; and (d) right of self-determination for colonial peoples, including the right to separate from Portugal, and assistance to peoples of the Portuguese colonies. 10/

The PCP opposed so-called "anti-national" policies, as symbolized by the Marshall plan and the Truman aid program to Greece and Turkey. To the PCP, the Truman Doctrine represented interference in the internal affairs of other states and a US effort to achieve world hegemony. The PCP claimed that the United States used the excuse of "Communist danger" to defend its policies. 11/

The PCP has consistently urged the establishment of diplomatic, cultural and commercial relations between Portugal and the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and other People's Democracies, which it contends would mean greater political autonomy and economic development for Portugal.

According to the PCP, only the peaceful policies of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies have served as effective obstacles to US imperialist designs for world domination. In 1952 at the Fourth Expanded Meeting of the Central Committee, the PCP declared that in the event of any future war the Portuguese people would not fight against the armies and citizens of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. 12/

The PCP praised the trade agreement which the Portuguese government signed in early 1956 with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany. The Party asserted that the agreement resulted from pressures exerted on the Portuguese government by the workers and democratic forces who demanded commercial relations with the People's Democracies. Party support of the trade agreement was coupled with a denunciation of the flooding of Portugal with exports from the US which in return refused to accept Portuguese imports.

On 23 September 1956, the PCP Central Committee sent greetings to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in which it pledged its continued opposition to turning Macao into a military base against China and using it as a center for provocation and espionage activities. The PCP stated that it had attempted to arouse the Portuguese people against the plans of the Salazar government for using Goa and Macao as a springboard for war and espionage activities against the Socialist camp. It opposed the policy of racial discrimination and

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national oppression toward the Chinese inhabitants of Macao, and cited the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party as cause for renewing the efforts of the Portuguese workers in their opposition to the Salazar government. 13/

In September 1956 the PCP sent a declaration of solidarity to the German Communist Party condemning its outlawing by West Germany on 17 August 1956. The German Communist Party, the PCP declared, was the strongest bulwark for peace, opposing militarism and Fascist reaction, and leading the struggle for German unification by peaceful and democratic means. It was prohibited, according to the PCP, to enable the West German government to remilitarize Germany and restore Fascism. 14/

H. Relations with the Spanish Communist Party

In 1946 the PCP and the MUD were reportedly in contact with the Spanish Communist Party through exiles who represented them and maintained communication. The exiles crossed the border to carry contraband and serve as contact men.

In Spain the Communist Party has lost no opportunity to organize parties of guerrillas, issue propaganda and commit sabotage to assist the PCP. 15/ Reportedly an understanding exists between the Portuguese and Spanish parties for provision of refuge for each other's members when necessary. Several "support points" set up along the frontier were reported in 1947 in the vicinity of Chaves, at Veiga Mea, at Cassas de Monforte and at Cambada. Other support points were believed to have operated near Bustelo and Samadaroos in Spain. 16/

The border territory in the north of Portugal, between the towns of Melgaco and Chaves, reportedly has been the meeting place for "subversive Spaniards and Portuguese opponents" of the Salazar regime. Presumably the objectives were to instruct the Portuguese in sabotage and acts of terrorism to be performed when the candidacy of General Norton de Mattos was announced by the government in 1948. The actions were designed to show that rigid oppression existed in Portugal, causing the people to rebel against the Salazar government. 17/

In April 1956, the Spanish and Portuguese Communist Parties signed a joint declaration to strengthen their bonds in the struggle for peace, independence and democracy. 18/ The primary objective of the declaration was to prevent the Iberian Peninsula from becoming a focal point of foreign intrigue, to weaken US imperialist plans and domination, and to transform Spain and Portugal into democratic states.

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The declaration stressed that both countries were controlled by Fascist dictatorships, that both were denied rights and liberties enjoyed by other peoples, and that both faced economic ruin and corruption by governing minorities. According to the declaration, the peoples are oppressed by Fascist cliques and American imperialists, who are using both Franco and Salazar to prepare plans for war and world domination; consequently, the national sovereignties of both countries have been surrendered and the Iberian Peninsula has become an aggressive American military base which threatens Europe, the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

Both parties proclaimed their intention to end the Fascist dictatorships and called for the formation of popular fronts, including all democratic and patriotic forces of both countries, and the annulment of the military pacts binding Spain and Portugal to US foreign policies. The declaration affirmed that the Fascist regimes could be changed through the peaceful means of parliamentary procedure without resort to civil war. But this could be achieved only if the largest number of political and social forces in both countries unite on a common program and policy.

I. 20th Congress of the CPSU and the PCP 19/

In an article published in Avante in July 1956, the PCP firmly supported the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the 30 June CPSU Resolution. According to the PCP Political Commission, these decisions marked "a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism" and opened "new perspectives for the united action of the working class of all capitalist countries to consolidate peace and to defend their interests."

The PCP praised the vigorous denunciation of the personality cult of Stalin and the restoration of collective leadership within the CPSU. It claimed that the 20th Congress of the CPSU took this action as a matter of principle to maintain faithfulness to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and to alert all Communist Parties against similar dangers to prevent the evil which the personality cult had brought to the Soviet Union.

The PCP acknowledged the role of Stalin as the most outstanding continuer of the Lenin tradition, as the most arduous fighter against the Trotskyists, Bukharinites and bourgeois nationalists within the Party, and as the author of valuable theoretical contributions to the labor movement. However, the PCP declared, in Stalin's activities there were revealed manifestations leading him toward violations of socialist legality and the cult of his own personality, which obscured the role of the Party and the Soviet people in the victories which they

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achieved in the construction of socialism and in the war against Hitler. In addition, Stalin adopted the false thesis that the class struggle had intensified after the seizure of power by the proletariat. This led him, at a time when the class enemies of the revolution and of socialism were already being liquidated as a political force in the USSR, to employ terror against them and to allow a band of criminals, headed by the traitor Beria, to commit a whole series of crimes to liquidate good Party militants and honorable Soviet citizens. It was necessary, therefore, to make impossible for the future the idea of the infallibility of a leader, because the 20th Congress of the CPSU clearly revealed that the personality cult deprives the militants and the masses of initiative and foments the subservience and the existence of automatons and puppets within the Party.*

The PCP admitted that it had been influenced by the personality cult, that Leninist norms for the work of collective leadership were violated, and that dogmatic forms prevailed in its leadership activity. Realizing this situation, the PCP asserted that it began even before the Sixth Plenary Session of its Central Committee in mid-1955 to take steps to establish collective leadership and to combat dogmatism.

The PCP stressed that new perspectives were opened to the workers' march toward socialism. The 20th Congress of the CPSU made clear that there is not just one road to socialism but that each people will be able to determine the most suitable road for itself. Each people will be able to promote and develop its national possibilities, and in this way, bring its own share of experience to the international labor movement. The PCP rejected any and all interference from other nations or governments in Portuguese internal affairs, adding that "it is for our people, and only for our people, to decide their own destiny!"

* At the Fifth Plenary Session of the PCP Central Committee in 1954, the Party affirmed its confidence in the "great disciples and continuers of the work of Comrade Stalin," adding that in the inspiration which it received from the Party of Lenin and Stalin, it was always mindful of the teachings of "our great guide and master Comrade Stalin." 20/

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The decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU are reflected in the Proposed Statutes of the PCP,* which were approved and published by the Central Committee in May 1956. The Party statutes condemn the personality cult and affirm that the Party conducts all its activities upon the Leninist principle of collective leadership, from the Central Committee on down to its lowest organizations.

According to the statutes, all Party organizations share collective responsibility in the administration, which means the evaluation and ample discussion, with each Party organization, of the orientation, activities and the collective resolution of Party problems. Collective responsibility, however, does not eliminate each Party member's individual responsibility and spirit of initiative.

* See Appendix A for Proposed Party Statutes. The Party stated in its announcement that "the lack of statutes has given rise to defective collective work, to lack of political and organic life of many organizations and to many deficiencies pointed out by the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee. Therefore, the statutes will help to eliminate many of our shortcomings." Why, after all these years, the PCP should suddenly realize that the lack of statutes is a serious obstacle to its progress has been interpreted as a move to appear more national and further removed from the directives of the old Comintern and Cominform. 21/

~~SECRET~~IV. Propaganda and Publications of the PCP

The clandestine conditions under which the PCP operates limit its capabilities and restrict its activities. The Party's most significant endeavor at present appears to be the clandestine printing and circulation of Communist propaganda. 1/ Both regular serial publications and pamphlets and leaflets issued on special occasions carry the chief Party directives, orders and regulations and set forth the Party line on current developments. These publications are to be read and carefully discussed in Party meetings so that PCP decisions and directives from the top down may be implemented. 2/

A. Publications

Of the Party serial publications Avante, founded in 1941, appears with the greatest regularity and apparently has the greatest influence. 3/ This ordinarily four-page newspaper usually has been issued once a month.* However, the Central Committee has recommended that Avante be published every 15 days. 4/ It is published in fine print on thin paper and displays a variety of different sizes and weights of type. 5/ Available copies show that 10 issues were printed in 1954, including two which covered two months each, indicating that in spite of government prohibition the organ now comes out with the same regularity as it did before a 1949 suspension of publication for some months. 6/

Other publications of the Party, such as O Militante, appear only at irregular intervals. While Avante is mainly a propaganda organ, O Militante is the Party's organizational bulletin, intended for Party members. In addition to printing documents and discussing Party policy, it analyzes the Party's work in specific situations, such as among the corkworkers in Lisbon and its environs. 7/

Comparison of a list of scattered periodicals issued by the PCP or by front groups in 1948 with those of 1954 shows a wider range of organs in 1948. With the exception of Avante, which is printed, most of these publications appear to have been mimeographed.

* Issues for September, October-November and December 1954 were numbers 191, 192 and 193 of the sixth series. Its price is one escudo or about \$.035 in US currency.

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1948

- O Ribatejo 8/ (published by MUNAF for peasants of Ribatejo)
- A Voz do Soldado 9/ (published by MUNAF for soldiers)
- Patria Livre 10/ (for armed forces)
- O Expresso 11/ (for railroad workers)
- Libertacao Nacional 12/ (MUNAF)
- Ressurgimento 13/ (MUNAF)
- O Campones 14/ (published by MUNAF for peasants)

1954

- Juventude 15/ (youth magazine published by MUDJ)
- Unidade 16/ (published by MND)
- Uni-Vos Pela Paz 17/ (published by the National Peace Committee of Portugal)
- O Campones 18/ (published by PCP for peasants)

In addition to the regular serial publications, the Party and its front groups also publish occasional propaganda pamphlets, leaflets and broadsides dealing with special issues, such as an appeal for amnesty of arrested leaders, or on special occasions, such as the January 1954 visit of the US fleet to Lisbon.

B. Circulation

The actual circulation figures for these Party publications are difficult to determine. In 1948 near Setubal the Party planned to publish 20,000 copies of one publication. 19/ The propaganda section of the Regional Committee of Sul de Tejo was to distribute to local committees a rough total of 1,672 copies of each issue of Avante 20/ and reportedly 2,500 copies were published each issue. 21/ Some 2,293 persons allegedly subscribed to Avante in the Lisbon sector. 22/ In 1952, in a

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self-congratulatory article on its peace campaign, Avante mentioned that 10,000 copies had been printed of an item on US atrocities in Korea and stated that the circulation of its last number had risen from 6,000 to 10,000. 23/

C. Clandestine Presses

The location of the clandestine presses which produce Communist publications is a continuing problem to the PIDE. Seizures of such presses in the vicinity of Lisbon and Setubal have been reported in the past. 24/

After the main press was seized in northern Portugal in 1949, it became evident that the party used a number of clandestine presses. In 1953 Avante was believed to be published in the vicinity of Oporto. 25/

Some of the propaganda may be printed abroad and secretly brought into the country by various means. The thinness of the paper on which recent issues of Avante and circulars are printed may support this view. Another theory is that a portable press is moved from one part of the country to another. 26/ Among the subversion charges filed against 10 persons tried in Lisbon in March 1955 was that of collaborating on Avante. 27/

Portuguese fishermen allegedly have brought Communist literature from Port Lyautey, Morocco, but this may include material prepared by others than the PCP. 28/ This could also be true of the publications brought in from Brazil and carried ashore by unloaders sympathetic to Communism. 29/

D. Party Control

The PCP organization includes units which oversee propaganda. A publication and propaganda unit, responsible to the Party Secretariat, oversees the work of an agitation and propaganda organ in direct touch with Party zonal and local committees. 30/ Various sections of the party have issued manifestos--sometimes the Secretariat of the Central Committee, 31/ frequently the Lisbon Local Committee of the PCP 32/ and occasionally the Central Committee's Political Commission 33/ and the Northern Regional Organization of the PCP. 34/ Party leaders responsible for publishing Avante reportedly were Pedro dos Santos Soares and his wife Maria Luisa Palminha da Costa Dias. 35/

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Recently the most active propaganda sponsors, judging by special circulars issued in 1953 and 1954, have been the front groups, the MND and MUDJ. Of these the MND Central Commission has been the most active. In the MUDJ, the Oporto District Committee has issued leaflets. 36/ The closely parallel propaganda line of all of these publications may be, however, one of the clearest signs of their central Communist direction.

E. Distribution

Recent information on methods of distributing PCP propaganda within Portugal is slight. The persons responsible for spreading Avante and Party leaflets at the lowest levels are continually shifting, as are those who cooperate, either willingly or unwittingly.

In 1948 certain Lisbon cafes, for example, were receiving publications imported secretly from Brazil and brought ashore by stevedores. 37/ Truck drivers enroute from Beja to Mertola reportedly carried printed materials in the Algarve and lower Alentejo regions. In the center and north of Portugal, the distribution base seemed to be Alfarelos, where a truck driver from Lisbon carried material. South of the Tejo the Regional Committee's Agitprop section supervised the local committees in the task of distributing the clandestine publications to factory cells, each to be supplied with a specific quota of Avante. 38/

Interrogation of Party members in 1948 revealed that newspapers were distributed through a chain of members, one person at each level passing copies to someone at a lower level. 39/ A Party document on procedures states that distribution of publications should be made at meetings especially arranged for this purpose and only rarely at regular cell meetings. 40/

In the summer of 1954 a pamphlet addressed to the textile workers of Oporto was distributed in the Oporto suburb, Ponte de Pedra, by a speeding car which tossed copies out of the window. Several thousand leaflets so scattered in the neighborhood of Oporto were later confiscated by the PIDE. 41/

F. Special Propaganda Efforts

The pamphlet and leaflet campaigns of the PCP do not flow continuously but seem to be centered each year around one or two key themes or circumstances. In 1952, at the time of the NATO meeting in Lisbon a substantial effort was made to attack

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the NATO pact. 42/ For several months before the November 1953 elections to the National Assembly, the Party published leaflets attacking "false democratic" candidates and the farcical character of holding elections under the restrictions of the Salazarist regime. 43/

In 1954, the Portuguese colony of Goa furnished a chief topic, with the MND appealing for its liberation from Portugal. 44/

G. Propaganda Line

Recent PCP publications reflect propaganda consistent with that of Communists elsewhere, but skillfully tempered to the special circumstances of Portugal. An examination of Avante and special circulars indicates that the general Communist themes of anti-Fascism, peace and abolition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, anti-imperialism and, especially "hate-America" are liberally represented, reshaped to conform to their Portuguese context.

1. Anti-Fascism

The Portuguese Communists claim they are the true anti-Fascists in the struggle against the Fascist tyranny of the Salazar regime. Their interpretation of Portuguese history is that Salazar's advent to power in 1926 ended the progressive advance of Portugal to democracy which had begun with the 1910 revolution. The Party appeals to all "true democrats," regardless of political or religious beliefs, to unite in a popular front and fight against the Fascist policies of the Salazar regime to restore to the Portuguese people their democratic liberties. Of the front groups the MND in particular stresses the need of restoration of a free press, supervision of the electoral law of 3 October 1949, and an honest count of votes to attain the goal of democracy. 45/

A primary objective is the release of the Communist and front group leaders whom the PIDE has arrested. A slogan typical of this view is "Out with the PIDE! Down with the Fascist Government, Lackey and Defender of the Exploiters and Warmongers of National and Foreign Wars." 46/

In 1956, the Party's local committee in Lisbon urged a national campaign to demand the immediate liberation of prisoners who have served their sentences, cessation of repressive PIDE activities, establishment of a humane prison system and complete

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amnesty for all political and social prisoners. Although the PCP has used this tactic for several years, the campaign for a political amnesty at this time appears to be a move to develop opposition support in the 1957 elections by emphasizing the repressive aspects of the Salazar regime. 47/

2. Peace

The Communist peace offensive is carried on mainly by the Movimento Nacional de Defesa da Paz (MNDP), but all Party publications reflect that group's arguments against atomic, hydrogen, bacterial and chemical warfare as well as the menace of a new war.*

In 1952 Moscow broadcast its approval of the peace appeal published by the PCP and condemned the punitive measures taken by the Portuguese government against peace partisans. 48/ Following an MNDP manifesto issued in October 1952, 49/ the MND bulletin Unidade of January 1953 picked up the peace theme with greetings to the World Peace Council (WPC) meeting in Vienna. A year later O Campones shared in the appeal for the release of Maria Lamas, a WPC member who had been imprisoned on her return from the Vienna meeting. 50/

The plea to substitute a peace pact for Portugal's participation in NATO is another facet of the PCP peace line. 51/ Bankruptcy for Portugal is forecast as the price of continued adherence to NATO.

In Avante the Party has urged a campaign of writing on walls such signs as "US Navy Go Home." 52/ During the visit of the US Sixth Fleet to Lisbon, 18-25 January 1954, a large number of leaflets and pamphlets were distributed with such slogans in English and Portuguese as "We Want Peace," "Let us Seek Peace; Out with the Americans," "Forward in the Struggle for Peace and National Independence." 53/

* Members of the Society of Portuguese Writers (Sociedade dos Escritores Portugueses), established 5 July 1956, reported to have supported Soviet peace activities include: 54/

Dr. Joao de Barros
Alexandre Jose dos Santos Cabral
Jose Maria Ferreira de Castro
Antonio Assis Esperanca

Jose Gomes Ferreira
Antonio Alves Redol
Luis da Camara Reis
Victor Marques Santos

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The Communist line on world tensions is faithfully followed in Portuguese publications, as exemplified by Avante's comments on the Geneva conference in 1954. 55/ The May 1954 issue of Uni-Vos Pela Paz, published by the National Peace Committee, perhaps best summarizes Party peace activities and reveals the intensity of the appeal that the only defense against the horrors of the hydrogen bomb lies in peace. 56/ The Party claims the current arms race is the main cause of international tension. It supported disarmament efforts and in September 1956 pledged cooperation to prevent the renewal of the military base lease at Lagens in the Azores and the presence of foreign forces on Portuguese territory. 57/

3. Anti-Americanism

Close to the theme that the Salazar Government is leading Portugal to the brink of war is the implication that this policy is really the fault of the United States because the repressive Salazar regime is dependent for its continued existence upon US help. 58/ While the Soviet Union is proclaimed in the vanguard of those who stand for peace, the United States and its military representatives in Portugal, threaten its national sovereignty. Salazar is a traitor to his country's interests in permitting the rearmament which Portuguese participation in NATO requires. 59/ A bitter attack upon government preparations for war includes emphasis upon the arrogance of the "Yankee" officers of the "American military mission ... that has installed itself... under cover of the Atlantic Pact." At the instigation of "American and British warmongers" even the Portuguese African colonies are being militarized in preparation for war. It declares that explosions related to rearmament have already brought death and destruction to Portuguese homes. 60/

The Goa question also is linked to US imperialism. A broadside addressed to the Portuguese forces claims that the Salazar government intends to sacrifice the lives of Portuguese soldiers in an unjust war commanded by American generals against the Indians. To eliminate American influence from Portugal and to negotiate for peace in India are double objectives to be sought by organized Communist demonstrations. 61/ Salazar's acceptance of the North Atlantic Pact and the Western European Union Agreement of 23 October 1954, as well as the Iberian Pact with Spain, are termed concealed preparations for a world war by American imperialists. 62/

The Brazilian Communist writer, Jorge Amado, appealed to Portuguese national pride in his 1954 message from Moscow to

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the Portuguese people. He accused the Fascist regime of "trying to transform the Portugal famous for discoveries and maritime adventures into a miserable North American colony." 63/

In 1955 the PCP openly opposed the government's plans for air bases in Portugal, claiming this would result in the occupation of Portugal by US forces. While contending that Portuguese national sovereignty is dominated by the US and Great Britain, the PCP praised the commercial agreements negotiated in 1956 between Portugal and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. 64/

4. Anti-Colonialism

The PCP charges that the policies of the Salazar regime have oppressed and despoiled the native peoples in the Portuguese colonies through "contracts" and "forced labor." It accuses Portugal of imperialism for retaining control of Macao, Goa, Damao, Diu and Timor. 65/ A statement of the Party line on colonialism appeared in the "Nota Oficial" on Goa, Damao and Diu, issued by the Central Committee of the MND. It was for disseminating this propaganda on India that the MND leaders, Professor Ruy Luis Gomes, Virginia Moura and others were imprisoned in August 1954. 66/

The Communists claim that the government, while stirring up a war atmosphere over India, has no interest in improving the living conditions and meeting the aspirations of the people it rules overseas. The MND asks how a government which cannot provide solutions for the social problems of the metropolis can resolve the same problems in its colonial territories. It quotes statements made by a New State deputy in the National Assembly to the effect that colonial discontent has sprung up because of the difference in political rights enjoyed by Portuguese citizens in India and in Portugal. The chief slogan, "Negotiate," links the colonial question to that of peace, calling for negotiation of the Goa question as the Geneva Conference successfully negotiated other issues. 67/

Special pamphlets have urged the recall of Portuguese soldiers from India as well as their refusal to load war materials for shipment there. 68/ A PCP statement acknowledges the rights of the colonies to fight for their sovereignty and independence and promises to fight for the right of the Indian peoples to decide freely their own destiny. 69/

The Party criticized the Dulles-Cunha communique on Goa, declaring that Goa is not a province but a brutally administered colony. In its greetings to the Eighth Congress of

the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956, the PCP pledged its continued opposition to turning Goa and Macao into military bases and centers of provocation and espionage against the Soviet Union and China. PCP propaganda contrasts the submission of the Salazar government to US imperialists with the peaceful policy of the USSR, and the visits of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma and Afghanistan. 70/

5. Social Grievances

Communist exploitation of social grievances in Portugal is more subtle than much of its other propaganda. Recognition of its line requires a comprehension of such local issues as the dissatisfaction of textile workers in the English factories near Oporto, where a productive speed-up campaign was blamed upon American methods. 71/

The MUDJ publications place great emphasis upon the PCP as the chief fighter for education, housing, improved living conditions and agrarian reform. 72/ The appeal to some of the difficulties of the peasantry may best be followed in an issue of O Campones. 73/ It deals with agricultural wages, attacks the large landholdings of southern Portugal--claiming the land should belong to those who till it--and comments on the difficult situation of the fruit producers in the Algarve. In 1949 Communist agitators were active in arousing the workers through intensified propaganda in farming areas, particularly those of Ribatejo and Alentejo, against what they called the "agrarian Fascists"--the owners of large estates. O Campones called on all workers to sabotage agricultural production. 74/ During 1955-1956, the crisis in the textile industry in northern Portugal also provided the Communists opportunities to foment unrest and discontent. 75/ Portuguese Communist propaganda attributes the economic situation in Portugal to the policies of the Salazar regime, controlled by the bankers, industrialists, large landholders and middlemen, who exploit the workers in their greed for greater profits and increase taxation to meet military expenditures, particularly in Goa. 76/

Party propaganda appeals to the workers have included demands for the following: 77/

- a. Establishment of a minimum salary in keeping with the cost of living for all workers;
- b. Reduction of the working day to 8 hours and the work week to 44 hours for all workers;

- c. Social security paid by the government and management, to cover reorganization, sickness and unemployment;
- d. Replacement of piece work by day-work with adequate pay;
- e. The right to form labor unions, for all workers, including government workers;
- f. Reduction in expenditures for the armed forces;
- g. Prevention of excessive profits and a progressive tax for higher income levels.

V. Front Organizations of the PCP

A. Democratic Unity Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democratica-MUD), 1945-1949

1. History

The Democratic Unity Movement was formed in October 1945, when the Salazar regime announced that persons opposed to the regime who desired to participate in the 1945 elections would be permitted to present their own candidates. Rigid government controls were somewhat relaxed to permit limited freedom of expression in the National Assembly elections of 1945. This announcement took the opposition completely by surprise. Only the Portuguese Communists had been able to maintain a skeleton underground organization, and although it was small, the fragmented opposition elements could not ignore the PCP. At that time the Portuguese Communists enjoyed increased status among the opposition forces because of the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers and the close relations between the Western democracies and the USSR.

Various opposition elements felt that this was an opportune time to oust the Salazar regime. They hastily organized the Democratic Unity Movement (MUD), which was composed of most of the Portuguese opposition groups, including the Communists, but excluded the dissident military leaders and monarchists. MUD continued to hold meetings until 1948, when the government dissolved it on the grounds of Communist infiltration. The National Democratic Movement (Movimento Nacional Democratico - MND) replaced MUD in 1949.

Division of opinion among the different political groups represented in the MUD militated against any but a general program. The MUD regarded itself as more of a movement than a party, with its main concern being the achievement of democratic government. It did not sponsor a concrete program of government measures but worked for free elections in Portugal. MUD stressed that it was an aggregate of democrats without the character of a party or the aim of a party coalition. 1/

MUD's demands included: 2/ (a) a new electoral law; (b) observance of fundamental public and private liberties; (c) abolition of the Tarrafal concentration camp; (d) official guarantee of complete freedom of the press and abolition of censorship; (e) dissolution of the National Assembly and new

elections, with freedom for political parties to organize and conduct campaigns; (f) free union elections and independence of unions from government tutelage.

Communists participated with republican groups in the MUD with the double aim of using them for Party interests and for sabotaging any effort contrary to the Party's objectives. 3/ MUD finally became disorganized as a result of misunderstandings caused by Communist insistence that it cooperate with the MUDJ (Movimento de Unidade Democratica - Juvenil, a Communist-sponsored youth organization).

2. Organization (1947) 4/

The central MUD elements in 1947 were:

- a. Assembly of Delegates, in which the deliberative power of MUD was vested;
- b. Central Commission, which held responsibility for executing the Assembly of Delegates' decisions and for coordination, inspection and general representation.
- c. Consultative Board, which gave opinions on questions brought to its attention by the Central Commission and, in general, questions of interest on the conduct of the movement.

Subsidiary elements were council, borough, parish and other auxiliary commissions and technical experts.

The district commissions and overseas commissions directed the activities of MUD in the various districts or overseas territories, in coordination with the MUD Central Commission.

3. Leadership

Although the early leadership of the movement was in the hands of the pre-Salazar statesmen, such as General Jose Norton de Mattos and Professor Caraca, the Communists succeeded in penetrating MUD and occupying leading positions. The MUD, however, continued active until April 1948, when the government dissolved it on grounds of Communist infiltration. 5/

The Minister of the Interior referred to a close link between MUD and certain subversive elements of the MUNAF. Several members of local and regional branches of MUD and

MUNAF were arrested in 1948 as PCP members. 6/ When the MUD was outlawed as a Communist-dominated organization, approximately 50 prominent movement members were arrested under charges prepared by PIDE. Among members arrested were: 7/

- a. Dr. Antonio Feio Ribeiro da Silva, a lawyer
- b. Aurelio Pereira Barbosa, a printer
- c. Flavio Soares Martins, an agricultural engineer
- d. Dr. Fernando Azevedo Antas, doctor of medicine
- e. Dr. Ruy Luis Gomes
- f. Dr. Manuel Marques Teixeira, professor
- g. Dr. Bento de Jesus Caraca, former professor
- h. Dr. Francisco Ramos da Costa
- i. Dr. Mario do Nascimento Canotilho
- j. Dalila Marques Maia
- k. Francisco de Almeida Salgado Zenha.

B. National Democratic Movement (Movimento Nacional Democratico - MND)

The MND is a Communist front (quasi-clandestine, not specifically banned but repressed) forming an extreme opposition group which replaced MUD in 1949. Since its inception the MND has generally followed the Moscow party line.

1. Leadership

Dr. Ruy Luis Gomes was reported chief of the MND in 1954. 8/ Virginia Moura, Dr. Gomes, Albertino Duarte Macedo and Antonio Lobao Vital comprise the Central Committee, which directs the activities of the MND.

Members of the MND Central Committee have been sentenced for crimes against the security of the state for subversive propaganda. 9/ The Communist clandestine press has claimed the MND as its own organization and has agitated against the

government's treatment of these "patriots." In this connection, it is noteworthy the MND claims that "democratic centralism" and "self-criticism" are among its fundamental tenets. 10/ However, members of the political republican opposition do not regard the group as Communist. From recent information, the republican opposition feels that although the MND is undoubtedly infiltrated by Communists, the Central Committee could at the most be called fellow travelers. 11/

2. Activities

Following the formation of the MND, the PCP stressed that Communist enterprise cells should assume new responsibilities in the activities and development of the new organization. The enterprise cells thus became responsible for the formation of MND committees within industrial, commercial and other business organizations.

The PCP recommended that its members seek active and reliable democratic workers to join in establishing these MND committees. In addition, the Party pointed out that all workers, regardless of their political convictions or religious beliefs, who are sympathetic to the "democratic liberties" of the people should be persuaded of the need for MND committees. An extensive MND organization was to be established with hundreds of members within factories and business organizations.

These committees were directed to participate in current political activities by organizing and agitating for the MND, distributing circulars, recruiting new members, maintaining contact with higher echelons of the MND and supporting its programs. They also were to conduct regularly "partial political struggles," such as signing petitions for liberation of democratic prisoners and participating in street demonstrations for the MND. The MND was to attempt to mobilize all workers, -- not solely the MND committees and "advanced elements" -- in protest manifestation.

In November 1955, the MND urged the preparation of a new census to facilitate a more accurate count of the electoral vote in the forthcoming elections for deputies in 1957 and for county councils and the President of the Republic in 1958. 12/

3. Propaganda

Appeals which the MND has stressed in its propaganda include: 13/ (a) free elections, amnesty for political prisoners,

freedom of expression, thought and public meeting; (b) suppression of the PIDE; (c) unity of all democrats in common front organizations against the Salazar regime; (d) resolution of the dispute with India by negotiation; and (e) calling upon Premier Salazar to exercise his constitutional power to form a new government.

4. Inter-Professions Commission

In 1952 MND formed an Inter-Professions Commission to develop leaders among the workers belonging to MND. Membership was intended to include persons from both labor and intellectual groups of the MND. The commission reportedly was responsible for printing and distributing anti-American propaganda on the Sixth Fleet's visit to Lisbon. 14/

C. National Anti-Fascist Unity Movement (Movimento da Unidade Nacional Anti-Fascista - MUNAF)

1. History

A front organization with which MUD was reported to work closely was the National Anti-Fascist Unity Movement, which the PCP helped to organize during the early part of World War II. The PCP had sought association with a "democratic" group through which it could operate. The MUNAF united socialist, democratic, anti-Fascist and leftist groups to work to undermine the Salazar government.

Because of the diverse groups and leadership represented in MUNAF, each contending for direction of the organization, the PCP imposed its view that there should be no leader but only a Grand National Council. Following approval, a National Council of Anti-Fascist Unity (Conselho Nacional da Unidade Anti-Fascista - CNUAF) was organized, composed of 30 representatives of associations and outstanding political and social leaders, 6 of whom represented the PCP. 15/ The PCP managed to control the whole organization of MUNAF, while the PCP closed its own Party organization to any members of MUNAF whom it could not use for its own purposes.

In 1943, the PCP provided the MUNAF with a hard Communist core and gave it broad direction. The PCP, however, avoided occupying more than a minority of the posts in the MUNAF, keeping only one Party member at each level. The PCP recommended that cities and towns form committees of national unity

composed of persons from all sectors of the population who were interested in the struggle against Fascist dictatorship. Although these committees usually comprised five members, of whom only one was a Communist, its members dominated the committees on which they served. In December 1948 MUNAF's organization included in addition to the National Council, the Northern and Southern Regional Committees and the Viana Regional Committee. 16/ When the PIDE started treating the MUNAF as a Communist front, it soon lost its importance as an effective cover and rallying point for the opposition to the Salazar government and has virtually ceased to exist. 17/

2. Program 18/

In an earlier period of its history, the MUNAF Council announced the following program:

- a. Salazar's government be replaced by a democratic national government representing all political elements, except Fascist, to prepare for free elections;
- b. An electoral program should be prepared to bring about a provisional government;
- c. A national anti-Fascist Council should be constituted to execute these measures and the MUNAF would organize a struggle to achieve the above objectives.

3. Activities

MUNAF has actively campaigned against the Salazar regime, distributing pamphlets and publications which purportedly contained documentary proof of official irregularities.

One document attempted to prove that the Portuguese government was a Fascist regime. It gave data on: 19/ the dissolution of all political parties and the establishment of a sole government party; laws of the political and military police; the tax system which favored the wealthy and burdened the workers; the textual declarations of Salazar approving physical tortures imposed on political prisoners; Fascist methods for militarization of youth; and attacks by Salazar against the democracies and liberal regimes. In 1948, the MUNAF presented a paper to the United Nations criticizing the Salazar Government. 20/

D. Democratic Unity Youth Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democrática, Juvenil - MUDJ)

1. Origin and Aims

In 1946 the PCP participated in the MUD organization of the Movimento de Unidade Democrática, Juvenil (the Democratic Unity Youth Movement - MUDJ), which has continued its activities since that time. The MUDJ was organized primarily to defend the special interests of youth and for the youth "of the masses" who have no party affiliation. Its proclaimed aims were the restoration of free elections and the establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal.

The mission of the MUDJ has been to attract young people to the joint committees (also known as unity committees) of workers who unite to present claims to the owners (management). The PCP and the MND seek to win the support of as many workers as possible in a given establishment (preferably a majority) to support such claims. 21/

The political influence of the MUDJ has been negligible, although as a training ground for future militants of the Portuguese Communist Party, the MUDJ is considered more of a threat than the MND. 22/

2. Organization 23/

A Central Commission under Octavio Pato's control heads the MUDJ. Below it are regional commissions; "Conselho" commissions; zone commissions, and bases within zones:

Central Commission
Regional Commission
"Conselho" Commission
Zones Commission
Bases*

3. Strength

According to the PIDE, the number of MUDJ members and sympathizers does not total more than 800 or 900. This would be a 20 per cent drop in membership since 1947. 24/ However, in

* Bases are not the exact equivalent of a Communist cell. Several bases may exist in one factory or school. 25/

1956 the Portuguese delegation to NATO estimated there were about 1,000 members in the MUDJ. 26/ In the early period of MUDJ activities, participants were almost exclusively students at the Universities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Oporto.

4. Recruitment Methods

The MUDJ concentrates its recruiting activities primarily among university students and youths employed in the principal industrial centers, mainly in glass factories, metallurgical plants and shipyards. It places special emphasis upon those who are unable to continue their education and concentrates on attracting students in the last two years of high school and first two years of the university. The MUDJ is always presented as a "movement" whose concern is the realization of the rights of each student and professional group.

Recruitment is a slow process and is made only by the MUDJ members who are friends of the candidate. Selection is based upon the complete confidence of the MUDJ members. As a consequence, no "training" period is necessary before new members are assigned to active work. The commissions to which the new members are attached are responsible for their activities. 27/

Conditions for maintaining membership are based on completion of studies, taking a job and reaching an age inappropriate for work in the youth movement. 28/

5. Activities

MUDJ activities have been limited to orderly demonstrations and discussion groups. Prospective members are indoctrinated in Communist ideology and are assigned to collect peace petition signatures, attend secret meetings and distribute propaganda. Basic propaganda themes stress that Communism favors peace and offers opportunities for youth.

In March 1947 the MUDJ organized a large scale "Youth Week." The agenda called for a number of meetings of Portuguese youth throughout the country to discuss national problems, but the plans were frustrated by police action. 29/ The MUDJ has agitated for disarmament, reunification of Germany, a general treaty of collective security for Europe and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Goa. 30/

In 1956 the Portuguese government began a campaign against Communist activity in lyceums, universities and intellectual circles. Professors, teachers and students were arrested, but most were released after interrogation. 31/

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6. Relations with the PCP

Although the PCP attempts to give the impression that the MUDJ is an independent organization, it is believed to be under the direct control and supervision of the PCP General Secretariat. 32/ The MUDJ is reported to have given financial assistance to the PCP, and some PCP functionaries at Coimbra have given orders that all students in any of the university organizations of the PCP should join the MUDJ. 33/

The PCP charges its members with responsibility for discussing such questions as youth organizations and movements to unite "victims of Fascism" within industrial and business establishments.

Although the MUDJ leaders favored the Communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), when requested to join WFDY they refused for tactical reasons, stating that their first duty was to bring liberty and democracy to Portugal. 34/

7. Leadership

MUDJ is reportedly directed by Octavio Pato, who as the PCP Central Committee member responsible for MUDJ's activities controls the MUDJ's Central Commission. Pato replaced Antonio Horacio Simoes de Abreu as MUDJ director in November 1952. Abreu, however, continues as a member of the MUDJ Central Committee, which also includes Alexandre dos Santos Castanheira, Jose Gil and three unidentified members.

Pato joined the PCP Central Committee in mid-1952. Earlier he was a PCP functionary in the Lisbon area. Castanheira, a lawyer, was arrested in May 1952 for distributing anti-Atlantic Pact pamphlets, but was released without being tried. He was at that time identified as a member of the Communist-controlled MND. Gil is a factory worker who has only recently been identified with the MUDJ. 35/

E. National Movement for the Defense of Peace (Movimento Nacional de Defesa da Paz - MNDF) 36/

In 1951 various elements of the MND and the MUDJ formed the Movimento Nacional de Defesa da Paz.

The Central Commission of the MNDF included persons of suspected Communist orientation:

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- a. Dr. Ruy Luis Gomes
- b. Maria Lamas
- c. Virginia Moura
- d. Maria Isabel Aboim Ingles
- e. Cegina Bermudes
- f. Texeira de Pascoais

Among its "peace" activities, the MNDP obtained a few hundred signatures to protest the aggressive use of the atomic bomb and attempted to distribute pamphlets in defense of peace and against American intervention in Korea.

Reportedly the PIDE nullified most of the peace campaign by denying its sponsors the right of public meeting and by suppressing the activities of the MND, MUDJ and MNDP, as activities of illegal, Communist-inspired organizations.

The MNDP is affiliated with the World Peace Council. Portuguese members of the Council reportedly are Ruy Luis Gomes, Maria Lamas, Manuel Valadares, and Antonio Jose Saraiva. 37/

F. Circulo de Cinema (Film Club) 38/

The Film Club has existed since March 1947. It is considered by the PIDE to be one of the branches of the PCP, controlled by the Party's cultural sector. This direct connection is not supported by any other available evidence.

Documents seized by the PIDE in 1948 during a raid on an apartment rented by the Circulo de Cinema indicated that the organization was controlled by a Board of Managers (Comissao Directiva) and a Secretariat (including a treasurer's office, a section charged with issuing a bulletin, a radio section, a library section, and a technical section).

A table of organization of the Circulo de Cinema found among the seized documents indicated the following officials:

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|
| a. President: | Ruy da Palmeira |
| b. Vice-president: | J. Silva |
| c. Treasurer: | Antonio Carvalho |
| d. Executive Secretary: | Eduardo Leite |

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APPENDIX A: Proposed
Statutes of the PCP

APPENDIX A

PROPOSED STATUTES OF THE PCP

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APPENDIX A

PROJECTED STATUTES OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY 1/

Central Committee, Portuguese Communist Party

Article 1 - The Party

The Portuguese Communist Party, founded on 7 July 1921, is the political party of the working class.

The Portuguese Communist Party is the highest form of organization of the working class. It is a voluntary and struggling union of mighty fighters of the Portuguese working class, peasants, manual laborers, and white-collar workers.

The Portuguese Communist Party bases all its activity on the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

The Portuguese Communist Party educates its members in the spirit of unlimited loyalty to the cause of the working class and the people and to the defense of national interests. It educates them in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and in love and solidarity among the workers and peoples of all nations.

The main objective of the Portuguese Communist Party is to establish socialism and to build up the Communist Party in Portugal.

At present the activities of the Portuguese Communist Party are directed toward strengthening the unity of all antifascist and patriotic forces in the fight against the Salazar dictatorship and power of imperialism in Portugal. The Portuguese Communist Party labors for the installation of a democratic government of national unity which, in protecting the masses, will establish an economic policy that will assure a higher standard of living for the people and lead the country on the path of democracy, national independence, and peace among all men.

Article 2 - The Party Members

Any man or woman may be a member of the Portuguese Communist Party, regardless of race or religion, as soon as he accepts the party program and statutes, actively participates in one of its organizations, and pays the dues established by the party.

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Article 3 - Admission to the Party

Enrollment in the party is individual. The organization or party members who recommend a new member for party membership should be able to vouch for his political and moral reliability and should be able to furnish any related information that might be asked of them.

Each petition for membership should be presented to the organization to which the sponsor or sponsors belong and, once accepted by that body, the proposal should be confirmed by the immediately superior organization.

Article 4 - Special Cases of Admission to the Party

In cases where persons belonging to other political parties ask for membership in the party, the question can be settled only by the Central Committee, and in case of opposition there, by the Political Commission.

In other special cases, the Central Committee or the Political Commission can approve admission to the party.

In cases of application for readmission by individuals who have been expelled from the party, it is necessary that the Central Committee study and approve the request.

Article 5 - Concerning the Relocation of Party Members

In case of relocation of place of work or even in the case of a departure from the locality in which he lives, a member should communicate this fact to the organization to which he belongs. A move from one organization to another shall be made in accordance with the rules set up by the Central Committee.

Article 6 - Duties of Party Members

A party member has the following duties:

- (a) To defend party unity, the mainstay of power and strength in the party, in every way. To be vigilant against all factionalist action and fight it with all his power.
- (b) To attend regularly the meetings of his organizations and to take active part in its works.
- (c) To popularize the political line of the party and to work tirelessly for its success.

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- (d) To improve his knowledge of the political line of the party and to strengthen his ideological capacity through the study of Marxism-Leninism, thus augmenting his capacity to help the party in its task.
- (e) To reenforce increasingly his bond with the masses, selflessly defending the aspirations and demands of the workers and the people.
- (f) To be a part of and to work in existing class organizations (unions, people's corporations, fishermen's corporations, orders, etc.) and defending therein the interests of his class.
- (g) To recruit for the party those workers who speak up in the defense of their class interests. A party member should take the initiative and bring courageous men and women into the party.
- (h) To comply strictly with party discipline.
- (i) Zealously to safeguard party secrets, to be vigilant in the fight against provocation, liberalism, and lack of confidence. No party member can maintain friendly relations with declared enemies of the party, the working class, or the people.
- (j) To be honest and sincere toward the party, not allowing the truth to be hidden or distorted. Untruthfulness and lack of sincerity of a Communist member toward his party are a grave injury to the party.
- (k) To exercise self-criticism and criticism of errors and deficiencies in the work of the party, and to strive to eliminate these.
- (l) To lead an exemplary political and private life. To base his relations with other party members on loyalty and brotherhood. To be modest.
- (m) In case of being taken prisoner, not to reveal to the enemy his political activities nor those of his fellow party members, nor give the enemy occasion to obtain any information on the activities of the party or any other democratic and progressive organizations.
- (n) To maintain complete loyalty to the party. A party member cannot belong to other parties or secret organizations.

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- (o) To organize actions which demonstrate solidarity to the victims of fascist repression.
- (p) To continue to carry on the party activities in case of loss of contact with the party, and to try to re-establish contact as soon as possible.

Article 7 - Rights of Party Members

The party member has the following rights:

- (a) To participate in the meetings of his group, to take part freely in discussions, to contribute to the elaboration of the political line of the party and to the resolutions of the group to which he belongs.
- (b) To be vigilant in the application of the party line and to criticize, within the organization to which he belongs, operational irregularities and deficiencies, and to see that his criticisms reach the attention of the superior organizations of the party, including the Central Committee.
- (c) To elect and to be elected to the organizations of the party.
- (d) To criticize any and every member of the party, regardless of what position he may hold in the party. All party members have the right to fight against tendencies to dodge criticism and to prevent irregularities from being hidden because these things only bring prejudices upon the party. He who keeps a member from carrying out his right of criticism and self-criticism violates the will of the party.
- (e) To discuss, through the intermediary of his organization, with the higher party organizations, including the Central Committee, all questions he considers of interest to the party.
- (f) To collaborate in the party press and to contribute, through criticism, to its betterment.
- (g) To participate in his group meetings when resolutions are taken concerning its operation or conduct, except for special cases in which, in the interests of the party, the group leaders declare otherwise.

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- (h) To appeal, in case of disagreement with the disciplinary resolutions imposed on him, to the immediately superior organism, going even to the Central Committee, if necessary.

Article 8 - Internal Democracy of the Party

The party organization is founded upon the principal of democratic centralism, which means the following:

- (a) Election of all leadership bodies from the bottom of the organization to the top.
- (b) Obligation of leadership bodies to give periodic reports of their activities to the organizations which elected them.
- (c) Strict discipline and majority rule.
- (d) Obligatory nature of rulings handed down by the higher organizations to the lower ones.
- (e) Prohibition of the existence of factions in the party. The party's problems should be discussed in the party organizations and not outside of them. After discussion within the organizations and once corresponding rulings have been made, these rules become obligatory for all of its members.

Important Notice. Because of the clandestine conditions under which the party is forced to function at present, we must undergo security measures which restrict some of the rights of party members and affect some aspects of internal party democracy, preventing the latter from being totally enforced. Under present conditions it is permissible:

- (a) That party members from the Central Committee on down be appointed or chosen for party organizations instead of elected.
- (b) That meetings and assemblies held for the purpose of presenting an account of activities be held only after gaining approval from the superior organisms.

Article 9 - Concerning the Application of the Principle of Collective Management Throughout the Entire Party

The party disapproves of personality worship or individualistic work which causes great damage to the party. The party conducts all its activities upon the Leninist principle of working under collective management, from the Central Committee on down to the lowest organizations.

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For this reason all party organizations share collective responsibility in the administration. This means the evaluation and ample discussion--with each party organization--of the orientation and activities and the collective resolution of party problems. Nevertheless the collective responsibility does not eliminate each party member's individual responsibility and spirit of initiative.

In the clandestine situation in which we are forced to live, all the party organizations witness their powers increased, and so enjoy more autonomy. This autonomy requires the strengthening of collective work, confers greater responsibilities, and demands great care in the orientation of work, especially with respect to the following questions:

- (a) To try to overcome, through their own initiative, any difficulties encountered in guaranteeing the political life of the party organization and members which they control. To assign them concrete tasks in accordance with their abilities, and to watch for the completion of such tasks.
- (b) To exhibit utmost revolutionary vigilance, complying with and executing the rules of conspiratorial activities cleansing the party of alien elements, obstructing the infiltration of the party by agitators, and surrounding the work of the party organizations and members with the utmost precautions.
- (c) To pay special attention to and take into consideration the opinions of the members in the lower organizations and to support an intense program of criticism and self-criticism throughout the entire party. Members of the directing organisms should maintain an attitude of self-criticism in front of the other members of the party, thus encouraging criticism of the superior organisms by the lower organisms, that is, from bottom to top.
- (d) To be strict in the selection of the cadre to be promoted, since under clandestine conditions it is not always possible to elect leaders. At present it is even more necessary to be very strict in the selection of the cadre, setting aside personal friendship and family ties, promoting those men and women who are strong, modest, loyal to the party and have shown political capability, fighting spirit and determination. The correct choice of cadres is necessary for the success of the party work.

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Article 10 - Structure of the Party

The party builds its organizations on a territorial and production basis.

In conformance with the requirements of function, defense, and life of the organization on a national scale, the Central Committee determines the sphere of action of each party organization and groups them in accordance with the requirements imposed by the clandestine conditions.

The organization that operates in a certain sector is considered superior to all those that operate within a part of that sector.

All of the party organizations are autonomous within their sphere of operations as long as their resolutions do not contradict the party line and party resolutions. The initiative of the organizations in this respect should be well protected and stimulated.

Article 11 - The Congress of the Party

The congress is the highest directing organ of the Portuguese Communist Party. The congress meets at regular intervals. Its convocation and rules of representation are made by the Central Committee. Special congresses are also called by the Central Committee. The congress performs the following functions:

- (a) Evaluates information given by the Central Committee and adopts the corresponding resolutions.
- (b) Examines and resolves on the approval of modifications of the programs and statutes of the party.
- (c) Establishes the political line of the party.
- (d) Makes resolutions on the organization of the party.
- (e) Elects the Central Committee of the party and fixes the number of its permanent and alternate members.

Article 12 - The Central Committee

In the interval between congresses, the Central Committee directs all the political work and organization of the party.

The alternate members of the Central Committee fill the vacancies of permanent members of the Central Committee. In Central Committee meetings, the alternate members have a consultative voice.

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In the interval between congresses, the Central Committee can choose new members.

The Central Committee holds regular meetings.

The Central Committee is responsible for the distribution of the party's strength, for the organization of controls on the application of party decisions affecting the various organizations, for the administration of the party's financial resources, and for the organization and direction of whatever commission and organization it considers necessary to assure the realization of the orientation and current tasks of the party.

The Central Committee elects from among its members the Political Commission and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The Political Commission of the Central Committee, which meets regularly, is the agency responsible for maintaining the Central Committee's leadership in the interval between Central Committee meetings. The Political Commission studies the need for and calls meetings of the Central Committee. Whenever situations arise that require the attention of the Central Committee, and when that body cannot possibly meet within the necessary time, the Political Commission should inform the members of the Central Committee of the situation and consult with them on the questions.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the organ which, in the interval between meetings of the Political Commission, is responsible for insuring the daily application of the decisions of the superior party organs, preparing and executing the political measures affecting organizations and cadres, such measures being indispensable to the application of the decisions referred to.

Article 13 - Provincial, Regional, Subregional, Local, Zonal, and Class Organizations and Their Directing Organs

- (a) The assembly is the superior organism of each of the provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations. The directing body of each of these organizations is elected by the assembly of the respective organizations.
- (b) The elections of the directing bodies in provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations should, under existing conditions, be confirmed by the Central Committee or by the organizations to which the Central Committee delegates these powers.

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- (d) When conditions do not permit the convocation of an assembly, the directing bodies of the provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations should be appointed by the Central Committee or by the organism to which the Central Committee delegates this power.
- (e) The concrete forms of organization and function of the party in the provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations remain under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee which shall endeavor to assure to each of these organizations a political and organic life.

Article 14 - Concerning the Activity of the Directing Bodies of the Provincial, Regional, Subregional, Local, Zonal, and Class Organizations

All the directing organs of the provincial, regional, subregional, local, zonal, and class organizations of the party have the following rights and duties:

- (a) To make resolutions and to use their own initiative in political questions in their sector of work.
- (b) To assure compliance with the decisions of the superior party organs.
- (c) To strengthen the organizations under their direction and to create new organizations.
- (d) To orient and to give practical help to the organisms and cadres of the party base in their work among the masses and in the organization of large and small campaigns by the people.
- (e) To select and assign party cadres under their direction.
- (f) To organize economic aid from the masses for the party and its press.
- (g) To enlarge and to control the distribution and study of Avante (Forward), O Militante (The Militant) and other party publications and to publish propaganda by their own means.
- (h) To develop the study of Marxism-Leninism, not forgetting the more important materials of the Portuguese Communist Party, thus elevating the ideological and political level of the entire party.

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- (1) These organizations are obliged to submit regular reports of their activities to the superior party organisms under whose direction they are.

Article 15 - Organizations at the Base of the Party

The cell is the basic organization of the party, its foundation and the fundamental link in the party's bond with the masses.

- (a) Cells are organized in businesses, factories, offices, mines; on fishing boats, merchant ships, warships; in ports, warehouses, legal offices, schools, hamlets, villages, estates; and in barracks, and other military installations of the various armed forces; etc.

The party directs its attention fundamentally toward cells within areas of work (production), but street cells may also be organized as long as the members do not work in places such as those mentioned above.

Cells can be created exclusively for women where conditions require it in order to facilitate the work of the party among women.

- (b) At least 3 members are necessary for the establishment of a cell. In the present clandestine conditions, when a cell reaches a certain membership, it should subdivide into nuclei which shall not be composed of more than 5 party members and which should meet collectively and regularly. The combination of all the nuclei constitutes a party cell.
- (c) The superior authority in the cell is the cell assembly. It elects its directing organism which is the secretariat of the cell.
- (d) Keeping in mind the defense of the entire party, the functioning of the cell assemblies is subject to the principles established in paragraph (c) of Article 13.
- (e) When conditions do not allow the functioning of the cell's assembly, the secretariat of the cell should be appointed by the immediately superior organization.
- (f) The directing organisms of the cells are responsible for submitting regular reports on their activities to the directing organisms of their sector.

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~~SECRET~~Article 16 - Concerning the Activity of Party Cells

In its sphere of action, a cell should do the following:

- (a) Reveal and explain the political line of the party to the masses and maintain strict allegiance to them. Promote the distribution of Avante, O Militante, and other party publications among the masses which have no party allegiance and incite agitation by means of documents issued by the administration and by other means taken on its own initiative.
- (b) Strengthen the unity of the working class, the peasants, and other working classes through their mobilization and organization in the struggle for their more urgent needs, working together with the unions, people's corporations, fishermen's corporations, etc., as well as with the authorities.
- (c) Stimulate the people's fight for local aspirations in the town wards and city blocks, the fight for democracy and peace; and the struggle of the youth and women for their own aspirations.
- (d) Increase the effective membership of the party, in accordance with paragraph (g) of Article 6.
- (e) Collect the dues and the payments for publications and organize the collection of funds for the party and for Avante.
- (f) Encourage criticism and self-criticism and be uncompromising in the face of defects and errors in the work of the party.
- (g) Reenforce the revolutionary vigilance and conspiratorial measures in defense of the party; strengthen activities against infiltration of the party ranks by enemy agents.
- (h) Promote and organize individual and collective study of Marxism-Leninism.
- (i) Meet regularly and discuss and assimilate the party orientation. Shape up political life in order to carry out and consolidate the work of the party in its place of operation in order to be able to contribute to the development and adjustment of the political line of the party.

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The street cells should carry out specific tasks in the class association to which their members might belong--in collectives, in sports groups, and in other legal mass organizations. These cells should also promote the fight for local improvements.

Article 17 - Work of the Party in the Mass Organizations

The party members should be active in the unions, people's corporations, fishermen's corporations, orders, and other class associations, cooperatives, sports and recreation clubs, unitary movements, and in all organizations of the masses in order to carry out the legal work of the masses.

The party shall be able to set up organizations to conduct the activities of the Communists in the legal organizations of the masses. In no case is the action of any party member to limit or compromise the independence of the organizations and movements for unity.

Article 18 - Party Discipline

Discipline within the party must be conscientious and must be recognized by all the militants as essential to the life of the party, to the defense and political education of each of its members, and to the unity of the party.

The party has only one discipline. There cannot be one rule of discipline for the leaders and another for the cells.

Violations of discipline seriously injure the party. Party organizations or members committing offenses shall be punished in accordance with their responsibility and the gravity of the offense.

The following are disciplinary measures of the party: (a) warning; (b) censure; (c) removal from duties; (d) removal from the party for a period of not more than 6 months; (e) expulsion.

Disciplinary measures (b) and (c) are approved by the offender's immediately superior organization and should be reported to the Central Committee.

In applying these measures, the organizations should be extremely careful; they must make sure that the measures are well-founded and, in case they are, must try to show the justice of the action, keeping in sight the enlightenment and political education of the cadres or organizations being punished.

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Disciplinary measure (d) cannot be applied without the approval of the Central Committee. The person or unit to be punished will refrain from all party work following the Central Committee decision. The punished party has the right to contest the accusations and appeal to the superior organization that imposed the decision. In all cases the party can appeal to superior organizations, including the Central Committee.

The disciplinary measure of expulsion is decided by the Central Committee. In cases where it applies to a member of the Central Committee, the decision rests with the party congress. Between congresses the measure can be applied by the Central Committee meeting in a plenary session after it has been approved by a 2/3 majority.

Expulsion is the maximum penalty which can be applied to a party member; it should be applied only in cases that seriously affect the life and principles of the party. When deciding on expulsion from the party, a great spirit of fellowship and prudence is necessary, carefully determining whether the accusations are well-founded.

The publication of expulsions or other party punishments can be made as soon as the Central Committee manifests its agreement.

Article 19 - Party Finances

The party finances are made up by the assessment of its members, its enterprises, from the initiative of the masses, voluntary loans, and gifts.

The minimum assessment paid by party members is established by the Central Committee.

Article 20 - Party Symbols

The flag of the Portuguese Communist Party is a rectangle of red cloth. Its length is $1\frac{1}{2}$ times its width. In the center of the flag, in gold color, appear the crossed hammer and sickle--symbols of work and the alliance between the workers and peasants. Above and to the left of the hammer and sickle, also in gold color, is a star with 5 points, symbol of proletarian internationalism. Under the hammer and sickle are embroidered, also in gold, the words: Portuguese Communist Party. Attached to the cloth in the upper left hand corner are 2 ribbons with the national colors: one green and the other red.

During all activities in which the flag of the party is displayed the national flag should be at its side.

The hymn of the party is the "International."

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APPENDIX B

I. BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON PCP MEMBERS AND
PROBABLE SYMPATHIZERS

APPENDIX B-I: Biographic Data on
PCP Members & Probable Sympathizers

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APPENDIX C

SOURCES

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